86. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Geneva0
Tosec 54. Eyes Only from the President to the Secretary. Fully understand force of your argument in Secto 591 and specifically agree that if a cease-fire is blatantly violated by the other side, we must face the prospect of UN and SEATO action and an appropriate military demonstration in Laos. For this, continued close understanding with the British [Page 190] is essential, and you should hold Home to the standards agreed at Key West and Bangkok. We have been going the last mile with them on the road of negotiation and cease-fire, and we will continue as long as reasonable men can agree that this road offers hope for a genuinely neutral Laos. But if there should be a serious change on the ground by military action of the other side, we should have clear British support for appropriate action. You should press this point with Home, with a view to clear understanding of common purpose. We should also aim at closest possible understanding with French, because three-power solidarity against Soviet pressure may be vital in even more important places this year. Our patience is being fully demonstrated; we must also maintain, with British support and French understanding, a readiness to act. This is the necessary condition for a productive conference.
It remains essential that any action be in conditions which will in fact impose maximum responsibility upon the other side, and accordingly the olive branch and the arrows must never be separated.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1161. Top Secret; Niact. Although the cable indicates that it was drafted and approved by the President, a copy sent from the White House to the Department of State for transmission to Geneva, which was signed by McGeorge Bundy, indicates only that the President approved this message. (Ibid.)↩
- Document 85.↩