85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 59. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary. Instructions for the Geneva Conference (Tosec 34)1 were most welcome and are entirely clear as to our opening conduct at the conference. I shall keep you closely informed on all developments because it will be essential for us to represent your views in detail as well as in general in such a delicate and crucial negotiation.
I do wish to comment on all important paragraph five. The effectiveness and strength of our position in Geneva will be critically determined by whether we are prepared, should negotiations break down, to act in Laos by military means, at least in the south, or whether we are in a position of trying to save what can be saved without SEATO action in [Page 188] Laos itself. I do not suggest that we should threaten or promise such action at Geneva but our underlying attitude must inevitably affect the tone of our statements and our private discussions with other delegations. We hope of course to reach a satisfactory result by negotiation which would avoid military action. But we must be clear in our own minds at some stage as whether we must accept an unsatisfactory result because we have no other acceptable choice.
Lord Home and I will be having private talks with Gromyko about a Laotian settlement which would reflect Khrushchev’s agreement to an “Austrian Laos”. I believe we can make real headway if Gromyko believes that we still are as determined as President and I said we were when we saw him in Washington. If he concludes that we have “abandoned Laos” he will chase us around the barn in negotiations. If we are serious, beyond a gesture such as leaving the conference, I believe there is a real chance that we can find a US-UK-USSR agreement which could reassure our SEATO Allies and avoid the atmosphere of defeat in Laos. But we are approaching the final stages where we cannot bluff because the bluff might be called.
At SEATO, CENTO and NATO I have been deeply impressed by the extent of the reliance of the free world upon the attitude of the United States. These nations have great respect for the combination of firmness and peaceful purpose which the President has shown. The olive branch and the arrows are both essential, and firmness without bluster will be supported both by our Allies and by many of the so-called uncommitted countries.
Regarding Laos, we have a fair chance of getting strong neutral support, partly because of the extraordinary patience we have shown in trying to find a peaceful settlement and partly because of their own anxiety about a Communist Laos. But even neutrals, for reasons which we might not admire, may abandon their own neutrality if they believe that we will shy away from confronting Sino-Soviet power when the chips are down. I recognize both the irritating and the agonizing issues involved but the United States cannot avoid the consequences of the role imposed upon it by the present historical situation.
It is my personal impression that the unfortunate Cuban episode had far more effect upon us in Washington than upon anyone else in the world. Our present task seems to me to be to shake off that affair and get on with our great central tasks. Among these is collective support for our solemn commitments in conjunction with more than forty Allies who represent the essential strength of the free world and are the indispensable associates we shall need to support vital American interests. The credibility of these great commitments seems to me to be crucial to the prevention of a general war.
[Page 189]We shall not negotiate seriously about Laos until a cease-fire has been reasonably frozen. But if such a cease-fire is blatantly violated by the other side I hope that we will be prepared to support UN and SEATO action by an appropriate military demonstration in Laos.
No one would regret more than I the involvement of American forces in such a place, at such a time and under such circumstances. But I do believe that a demonstration can be made without its getting out of hand and without escalation into a general war. This should be checked with best intelligence and analysis available in Washington. But it seems to me that the Sino-Soviet bloc would be very reluctant to let Laos get out of control under conditions which would impose upon them maximum responsibility for pressing a military rather than a peaceful solution. My own judgment is that they are playing for far larger stakes throughout the world and that they would accept continued negotiations or some sort of UN action before major escalation.
Reading Tosec 34, I would conclude that the possibility of action of SEATO or some group of SEATO members is considered to be a very real one and that it is not expected that we negotiate at Geneva on a basis of weakness but rather with the purpose of obtaining the independent and neutral Laos which we have publicly affirmed as our central object.
I regret the length of this message but wish to be sure that assumptions on which I interpret our instructions are known.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1161. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received at 9:23 p.m., May 10.↩
- Document 84.↩