Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

81. Paper Prepared for the International Conference on Laos at Geneva⁰

FNL 0–1/1

Washington, May 3, 1961.

SCOPE PAPER

Introduction

This paper outlines the scope of our approach to a 14-Nation Conference on Laos. It suggests the actions needed before the Conference, during the Conference, and after the Conference.

Our strategy for a Conference aims at developing actions, themes, and proposals which will form a strong and hard-hitting position of maximum impact by mobilizing all potential resources to extract the maximum advantage out of this Conference for the free nations of SEA and the US. Our objectives at this Conference are the following:

a) To convince our allies and the neutrals that Communism is not the “wave of the future” and that the US is determined to preserve the independence of Southeast Asia;

b) To obtain a united, independent, and non-provocative Laos built on a new internal and regional structure reflecting the historical realities of Laos and the needs of Southeast Asia;

c) To create a sense of unity and purpose with the Asian allies and neutrals and seek their active identification and involvement with our strategy and objectives;

d) To prevent the Communists from gaining psychological, political, or military advantages at the expense of Laos, Free Viet-Nam, the United States, or the Free World generally.

To achieve these objectives we need: a) dramatic presentations at the Conference; b) military, political, economic, and psychological reinforcement in Laos, Thailand, and Viet-Nam before and during the Conference; and c) mobilization of Congressional support and public opinion to strengthen the hand of the American negotiators.

Background of Conference

The Free World position as we approach a 14-Nation Conference is neither strong nor unified. Militarily, the Royal Lao Government is in almost disastrous straits. This situation is unlikely to improve without increased direct intervention from outside Laos.

On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that we do still have certain important assets in Laos which we must use to the best possible advantage and which we certainly must not dissipate.

The Royal Lao Government still holds much of the area of Laos, including all of the main population centers. We still have a government in Laos which is prepared to cooperate closely with the US. We have the King, who, despite his hesitancy to take strong action, is devoted to preserving his country from Communist control. We still have a National Assembly which is rather timid but which wants to save the country from Communism. We still have a Lao Army of some 30,000 men. We have in place in Laos a carefully selected and experienced body of American personnel. We also have on either side of Laos determined US-Asian Allies who would follow our leadership in military action to defend Laos from further Communist encroachments.

Neutrals and several of our close allies view developments in Laos as the result of inept and narrow-minded US policies. They believe almost any solution in Laos is preferable to the risk of war. Most are agreed that the only feasible settlement is probably a neutral Laos requiring significant concessions to the Communist instrument, the NLHX. In return for such concessions many of our friends would hope that control machinery could be established to guarantee Lao neutrality.

Given such a climate of desperation and despair, the US will have great difficulty in achieving its basic objective even with an all-out effort.

Key Role of Neutrals

We should seek to make this Conference a turning point for Asian neutralists. In this Conference the three participating Asian neutralists will be faced with the choice of joining a diplomatic effort to hold the line against the Communist threat to Southeast Asia or of resigning themselves to ineffectual appeasement of a relentless Communist advance. We must try to impress upon these three Asian neutralists that if they will support realistic provisions for a neutral and adequately safeguarded Laos, then it may just be possible to achieve that objective through this international conference.

The choice which the neutral Asians will make will be significantly affected by the stance of the United States. The neutrals will be vocally interested in assuring themselves that basic US positions in the Conference itself are reasonable proposals and are not provocative; but the neutrals will watch with a quiet intensity what is to them of much greater importance—the evidence of US resolve in terms of military strength in the area and the degree of our willingness to use it when necessary.

Pre-Conference Tactics

A. Military

The weak military position of the Royal Lao Government is perhaps the most serious handicap which we will take to the Conference. It is therefore essential that every means be exploited to rectify this disadvantage before the Conference convenes.

We must now take military steps, if possible in conjunction with SEATO as a whole but at the very least in close coordination with Thailand and South Viet-Nam, so that we will be prepared on very short notice with our own and allied forces to:

a) secure the Mekong Valley Basin in Laos from the Sino-Burmese to the Cambodian border, thus assuring Thailand’s frontier;

b) interdict Communist attempts to cut Laos in half and establish positions opposite Thailand on the Mekong River;

c) seal off the north-south Communist access through Laos to free Viet-Nam.

B. Political

Despite its weaknesses, the present Royal Lao Government is the most sympathetic to our point of view which can be obtained. It represents a strong commitment to resist Communism, and would be willing to seek external intervention if we should decide upon such a course of action. This asset will be essential until such time we are convinced that a favorable political solution can be found or until events preclude the possibility of further effective military actions. Despite its drawbacks, the present RLG is broadly representative of major geographic, ethnic, and family elements, and in better times would probably elicit wide support.

C. Psychological

Continued US actions and propaganda output should emphasize US determination to prevent a Communist take-over in Laos while at the same time stressing our willingness to cooperate in the evolution of a truly neutral Laos with appropriate safeguards to guarantee such status.

Within Laos, our position of support for the present government should be unequivocal and every assistance should be given to solicit popular support for it and its military efforts. Intensified effort must be made to identify the US with the survival, welfare, and development of Laos.

D. Economic and Social

Current unsettled conditions make it impossible to execute a conventional full-scale assistance program which is likely to have any relationship to the realities of the future. However, every effort should be made to utilize and expand our existing assistance programs to bolster civilian, administrative, and military morale throughout the country but especially in areas threatened by enemy pressures.

Detailed planning must now be urgently undertaken to determine the type, scope, and new organization of economic and social assistance we would be prepared to move immediately into Laos.

E. Coordination of Positions

Pre-Conference consultations should be conducted at the highest levels in an attempt to reach agreement on Conference strategy. Approaches should be made by our Ambassadors at highest levels to the British, French, Vietnamese, Lao, Thai, and Canadians. Because of their direct involvement detailed and closest consultations should be held with the Thais and Vietnamese at the earliest opportunity.

Similar but tailored approaches also should be made to neutrals: Cambodia, India, and Burma.

Conference Strategy

A. Preventing Resumption of Hostilities

The first order of business should be to ensure that there would be no resumption of hostilities during the Conference. This will require revised terms of reference for a successor commission to the ICC and adequate facilities for it to accomplish its mission. The Conference could well founder on Communist unwillingness to accept the safeguards we should insist be provided.

B. Package Proposal

If agreement can be reached on a satisfactory cease-fire, the leader of the US delegation should present a US-sponsored package proposal at the earliest opportunity. Hopefully, through prior consultation, we may have the support of our allies and some neutrals. In summary our opening proposals would include:

1) a declaration of support for neutrality of a free and independent unified Laos if appropriate machinery can be developed to assure this end.

2) US willingness to contribute manpower, facilities, materiel, and funds to assist in the social and economic development of Laos.

3) a proposal to disarm and eliminate all military forces in Laos and to limit internal and police security forces ultimately to about 20,000 men.

4) an outline for a Peace Preservation Commission to be established to monitor Lao neutrality for the 14-Nation Conference. The Commission will be composed of a member from outside the area representing the Communist powers, one from the Free World but outside the area, and a technical neutral, perhaps Sweden or Switzerland. The terms of reference of this Commission should be broad and members must have free access to the entire country. Individual members must be free to make investigations and submit reports.

5) a proposal for an Assistance Development Authority composed of India, Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya to assist in the planning, procurement, and utilization of foreign economic and technical assistance. The primary purpose of the group would be to prevent perversion of economic and technical assistance; additionally this group will evaluate the various aid programs and assure that they are consistent with Lao neutrality and independence.

6) at an appropriate time during the Conference a possible appeal to the King to call for the establishment of a provisional government which will represent the widest possible interests in Laos. This provisional government should be responsible for the re-establishment of law and order and re-integration of all Lao into the national community as well as to prepare for elections to be held at such time as conditions permit.

7) a proposal that the responsibilities of the 14-Nation Conference and the control and supervision mechanics established thereunder shall cease five years hence unless the co-chairman and the Lao Government at that time shall decide that another international conference is required to re-examine the situation to provide further guarantees for Lao integrity and independence. It would seem that the RLG should also reserve the right to ask the various control mechanisms to disband once it were satisfied of its own security and viability and its capacity to survive without the presence of foreign groups which are in themselves incompatible with national independence.

8) a clear indication that the US will not discuss subjects other than Laos at the Conference. Attempts may be made by the Communists to raise extraneous topics such as the conflict between North and South Viet-Nam, Viet-Nam and Cambodia, SEATO, and perhaps even US relations with Communist China.

C. Negotiating Positions

The Communists obviously will not accept our package proposal in toto and may be expected to attempt to pervert our proposals and counter with their own. Major difficulties may be expected over Communist attempts to 1) assure PL continued control over areas they now hold militarily; 2) insist on the formation of a provisional government with strong PL influence—or even urge recognition of the Souvanna Government; 3) removal of all US presence; and 4) introduce extraneous topics, e.g. SEATO, KMT troops, recognition of Communist China, and the conflict in Viet-Nam.

During this hard negotiating period the US may have to adopt the following basic positions:

1) no recognition of the Souvanna Government and no agreement to any interim coalition government which would be dominated or significantly influenced by Communists.

2) no agreement to elections within one year.

3) PL and Kong Le forces must be disarmed and only a minimum integrated into RLG forces and in such a fashion as to nullify their potential for organized military revolt.

4) control machinery for policing internal security must have access to the whole country and not be hamstrung by unanimity rule.

5) US must retain opening for maximum freedom of action and influence in both security and economic fields.

Should we see our position at the Conference eroding to a point where acceptance of the agreements which could be reached with the bloc would amount to virtual surrender of all of Laos to the Communists (i.e., vetoable ICC, weak central government with substantial NLHX representation, continued de facto PL control over areas it now occupies, integration of sizeable numbers of PL into Laotian armed forces in large units), through the RLG, the Thais and the South Vietnamese, and directly, we should (1) make it clear that we will not agree to the creation of a non-viable and Communist-dominated “neutral Laos,” (2) attempt to show that we but not the bloc are prepared to create a truly independent, neutral, and viable Laos, and (3) argue that the Conference at the very least should give some semi-permanent status to the cease-fire line of demarcation so that pending new negotiations on creation of a truly neutral Laos the country might be spared further hostilities. If we were successful in getting the Conference to give some status to the demarcation line we would envisage close cooperation between the Thais, the South Vietnamese, the RLG, and ourselves in the military defense and economic development of the Mekong Valley and of southern Laos. If the Communists refused to permit the Conference to give any status to the demarcation line, we should attempt to show that this refusal was clear proof of the Communists intention further to use military force for aggressive purposes in Laos and together with the Thais and the South Vietnamese (and if possible with SEATO blessing) we should intervene with our own forces to secure the Mekong Valley and southern Laos.

We should attempt to avoid a situation at any stage developing where the other Conference participants become committed to accept a package that we (probably together with the Thais and the South Vietnamese) could not accept and from which we would then be forced to disassociate ourselves.

Post Conference Strategy

The Conference may result in several possible situations:

1) ideally, the Communists will accept our proposals for a “peace sanctuary” with military disarmament, a provisional government, and control procedures.

2) more likely, the Communists will not buy such a package but rather will insist upon conditions more certain to assure not only their control of presently held territory but also strong influence over a resultant government with the corollary implication of elimination of real or potential US influence in Laos.

3) a third possibility would be for the Conference to end in failure to agree to any solution.

4) a further probability, well borne out by past experience, is that the Communists would not honor their commitments to the Conference solution.

It would appear that the US should prepare now to meet these contingencies.

Military

We must sustain a military build-up in Thailand and Free Viet-Nam and be prepared to take direct military action in Laos if the Conference fails and the Communists resume their military operations.

We must also be prepared to give Thailand and Free Viet-Nam firm bilateral assurances that the US will give them full protection against Communist attacks and encroachments.

SEATO, if it is to survive as a meaningful organization, must be prepared to take military action in Laos in the event of a failure to reach a negotiated settlement or in the event of Communist disregard for a political settlement. Planning should be done now to determine whether SEATO in its present form can be expected to provide the military support which may become necessary. If it is believed SEATO cannot perform these duties, steps should be taken to modify the organization or replace it with something which will.

Political

Preparations should be made to assist friendly political groups in their efforts to establish political organizations throughout the country and to win elections.

The National Assembly must be kept in being until Communists’ intentions have become better known. It is possible that the Assembly could provide the means for assuring the continuation of a friendly government and if necessary provide the legality for a partitioning of the country.

Economic

In the immediate post-Conference period, we should be prepared to move ahead rapidly with an imaginative crash economic and technical assistance program which can be used to preclude the Communists in important assistance sectors. We should also gear our crash program in such a way to assist friendly political leaders in their attempt to build a political organization and to win popular support.

Conclusion

Through the Conference and thereafter, assuming that the United States achieves an acceptable Conference solution, we should hammer away at the following themes: Recognition of Laos as a Peaceful Sanctuary, Support for a United Kingdom of Laos—Muong Lao, Preservation of Lao Social and Religious Institutions, Conversion of Cannon to Tools for Peace with Security, Reconstruction of Laos by International Assistance.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1873. Secret. Drafted by Young and Corcoran; cleared by Steeves, Usher, Anderson (in substance), John P. White of H, and Czyzak; and approved by Rusk. A copy of this paper was attached to an undated memorandum from Rusk which was sent to the President; see footnote 2, Document 4.