8. Memorandum for the Record0
The meeting in the Cabinet Room began at approximately 9:45 a.m., and Senator Kennedy indicated he wished to discuss at this meeting the topics on the enclosed list (Tab 1).1 The President opened the meeting stating that we have topics for discussion of such importance and complexity that we could talk for as long as a week on them, and asked Senator Kennedy if he would like to start off the discussions.
1. Laos
Senator Kennedy stated that he would like to have discussed the basic unconcluded decisions with respect to Laos and get the advice of the outgoing Administration on them. The President stated that [Page 21] unilateral action on the part of the United States would be very bad for our relations in that part of the world and would cause us to be “tagged” as interventionists. He stated that the situation was complicated by the matter of recognition of the Phoumi government by some of our Allies and indicated that Great Britain preferred a unilateral approach rather than through SEATO. He then asked Secretary Herter to expand on this subject. Mr. Herter talked for about ten or fifteen minutes and I asked him to give me a memorandum covering his discussion which is attached at Tab 2.2
In addition to Secretary Herter’s memorandum, I would like to add the following points covered in the discussion of this subject:
Secretary Herter emphasized that neither the British nor the French wished to go to SEATO on the subject of Laos and that the French have a preferred position in Laos and will strive to keep it so. He indicated that a SEATO approach to the problem would probably result in the elimination of the British and the French from the SEATO organization. Senator Kennedy pointed out the advantage of the Soviets in the military situation due to their proximity and that if we got into the situation militarily we could find ourselves in an escalation situation. Secretary Herter indicated that this could be so, but it would come down to a question as to what extent the Soviets would wish to get publicly involved.
Senator Kennedy asked the President which he would prefer: coalition with the Communists to form a government in Laos or intervening through SEATO. The President replied that it would be far better to intervene through SEATO and referred to the example of the coalition with the Communists which was set up in China at the time General Marshall was sent there. The President pointed out that unilateral intervention on the part of the United States would be a last desperate effort to save Laos, stating that the loss of Laos would be the loss of the “cork in the bottle” and the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East.
Senator Kennedy asked what could be done to keep the Chinese Communists out of the situation in Laos. The President replied that he did not think that the Chinese Communists wished to provoke a major war and that it comes down to a question of who will take steps to do this. The President further stated that it is like playing poker with tough stakes and that there is no easy solution. He mentioned the Communist influence on Chinese troops, pointing out their ability to get much higher morale among the under-developed peoples than seemed to be the case of the Western Allies. Senator Kennedy mentioned the apparent weakness of the troops of the government of Laos.
[Page 22]The President pointed out the attitude of General De Gaulle as another complicating factor in getting coordination and agreement of the major Western powers. He mentioned that De Gaulle’s thinking on every matter is dominated by an obsession that a triumvirate of the United States, France, and Great Britain should decide on all these matters—that this triumvirate should be organized on a joint staff concept. The President went on to state that any action of this type would break up NATO immediately.
Senator Kennedy asked Secretary Gates if we could intervene in Laos militarily with success. Secretary Gates replied that he was pessimistic about the political situation but that we could handle the military situation successfully if we did intervene. He indicated that the only optimistic plan would be to operate through SEATO, but that Laos must make the request and, to date, Laos has refused to do this. Secretary Herter indicated that this would preclude a political settlement of the problem, and Secretary Gates again emphasized that Laos is the “cork in the bottle” insofar as the Far East is concerned.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961–1969, John F. Kennedy, 1960–1961 (2). No classification marking. Prepared by Persons, Assistant to the President.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See Document 7.↩