Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

7. Notes of Conversation Between President-Elect Kennedy and President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, January 19, 1961.¹

I visited E. [Eisenhower] this morning at 9:00 o’clock. This last visit had been suggested by Roscoe Drummond, who had informed me that as a result of a visit he had had with the President he thought the President would welcome a second visit from me.² This fit in with my own desire. I was anxious to see E. for two reasons:

• First because it would serve a specific purpose in reassuring the public as to the harmony of the transition. Therefore strengthening our hands.
• Secondly because I was anxious to get some commitment from the outgoing administration as to how they would deal with Laos which they were handing to us. I thought particularly it would be helpful to have some idea as to how prepared they were for military intervention.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

At 9:45 a.m. we went in where the six Cabinet members were seated and we continued to discuss the issues. Mr. Herter talked most of the time. He pointed out that as to the question of Laos that any proposal which would include communists in the government would end up with the communists in control of the government and therefore this solution should be regarded with great suspicion. He agreed that the local government forces were more vigorous in the struggle but he said this could be improved with the MAG [MAAG] group being sent there. This would not in any way be against the Geneva pact and the Germans were bitter about this matter anyhow. He stated that they were afraid that the British and French would not respond. I asked the Secretary as to whether in his opinion we should intervene if the SETO [SEATO] was invoked by the government. He said very directly that he felt we should. It was the cork in the bottle. If Laos fell, then Thailand, the Philippines, and of course Chiang Kai-shek would go. I turned to the President. He stated also that he felt we should intervene. When I asked him whether he felt that the communists could intervene with greater force he said it was a question as to whether they would be willing to see the war spread. I asked Mr. Gates whether he felt the United States would have sufficient military power and he said he felt they could; that they had conducted a survey and while we might not be able to handle two fronts, they could handle one. He also said that with the use of certain aircraft it would be possible to cut down the time from 17 days to 12 days to move 12,000 men and supplies for these men in the Pacific and the Marines from Okinawa.

I came away from that meeting feeling that the Eisenhower administration would support intervention—they felt it was preferable to a communist success in Laos.³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Special Correspondence, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Secret. Dictated by Kennedy to Evelyn Lincoln.
1. According to President Eisenhower’s appointment book, he met with Kennedy from 9 to 11:10 a.m. The President and the President-elect met alone from 9 to 9:45 a.m. and then joined members of Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s cabinets including Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense-designate Robert McNamara. Clark Clifford also attended, but he is not listed as a participant in Eisenhower’s appointment book. (Ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)
2. The first meeting was on December 6, 1960, and Laos was only briefly discussed. (Memorandum for the Record by Persons; ibid., Ann Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series, Memos—Staff Re Change of Administration (2))
3. Evelyn Lincoln added a postscript to these notes indicating that Kennedy asked her to find out if Clifford and McNamara took notes, and if they did so, to get him copies.