Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

436. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, November 17, 1962, 7 p.m.

758. Policy. Embtel 729;¹ Deptel 518.²

1. Despite recent lessening in surface tensions in Vientiane past few days, we believe PriMin Souvanna’s recent statements of intent to resign are serious as well as being tactical moves. If situation worsens and his pessimistic assessment is further strengthened he may act, perhaps precipitously, within a few weeks.

2. We believe Souvanna recognizes flat obstructionism of left as key problem but has found recent pressures from right (especially DNC) increasingly onerous, largely because they have result of sandwiching him in without vulnerability. (This at some variance from line British have been peddling that DNC actions “responsible” for Souvanna’s present mood.)

3. Souvanna’s task made to seem well nigh immovable in his eyes (and our problem of sustaining him made more difficult) by virtual collapse of center. Fissiparous tendency characteristic of Lao political life has struck first and hardest at neutralist element which, from beginning, was most amorphous segment of Troika team (Embtel 732).³ In political power terms, pyramid constructed at time of Plaine des Jarres agreement has become inverted, with Souvanna the balancing point at bottom rather than at apex. This inversion is largely Souvanna’s fault and is clearly an unstable condition.

4. Major deciding factor in outcome present situation will be Pathet Lao actions. Recent behavior and anti-Souvanna propaganda suggest PL must now foresee early collapse of coalition (Viet Minh determination retain substantial forces in Laos may in part also reflect such an expectation). Souphanouvong could probably temporarily stabilize situation at relatively little cost to Pathet Lao interests: minimum concession would in present atmosphere assume exaggerated significance and might suffice to allay Souvanna’s discouragement. Would also tend put Phoumi on defensive, in which case US influence could be made more effective. Such shift in PL tactics, however, would seem to require (a) PL Central Committee decision, (b) effort by Souphanouvong to get out from under hard-core PL political and military leadership, which would be beneficial in itself but would carry no guarantee of PL adherence to coalition solution, or (c) Soviet decision loyally support Geneva Accords whatever may be ChiCom and DRV positions, and whip-cracking to enforce this with PL.

5. At this precise moment US leverage with Phoumi is reduced. Prior to negotiation new aid program, we have limited aid to withhold, and we have been pressing him on variety of matters to act in good faith despite clear faithlessness on Communist side. We see little opportunity elicit greater cooperation short of unreliable alternatives of a) offering greater support if he proves more responsive our suggestions and b) warning him US will not support him even if he successful in returning leadership in post-Souvanna period. Until recently he has shown little disposition to “save” coalition and unlikely do so if it must be at expense his position vis-a-vis his own mixed stable of subordinates or of significant weakening his posture relative to fully armed and apparently tightly knit PL.

6. Neutralist group (para 3) offers little promise in terms reforming Troika along present lines. As indicated Embtel 732, we see no one equally acceptable who approaches Souvanna—who is willing—in ability command loyalty and active support. British seem to consider Pheng Phongsavan, Quinim or Ngon Sananikone as possible replacements for Souvanna. We believe Pheng would be highly unreliable maverick and fail to see how result in latter two cases could be other than two-part and most unstable coalition of left and some neutralists or right and other neutralists, respectively. Pheng, as well as Quinim, now target of criticism in Souvanna’s neutralist party paper. Phoui Sananikone, Leuam Insisiengmay, and other conceivable choices have same defect of partisan identification.

7. We doubt Kong Le “lost” to other side and inclined credit statements of his present mood indicating preferences for alignment with some conservatives and US to continuation present straitened and uncomfortably exposed position. At same time we do not believe FAR as weak or Kong Le forces as strong as picture presented by Souvanna’s advisors (Embtels 715, 727).⁴ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ARMA reports have indicated parlous state Kong Le forces PDJ area. Open renewal of PL military action would undoubtedly find significant portion Kong Le units chewed up in quick order. Kong Le nevertheless is only strong element of power in support of neutralist position (Khamouane having probably been too compromised as result recent events and now too preoccupied with upheaval in his own back yard). While it seems most unlikely at present juncture any significant segment of FAR would subordinate itself to Kong Le, agreement for cooperation between them no longer seems absurd. Participation of Phoumi in such an agreement almost surely requires dissolution of present Phoumi-DNC relationship, and it is not clear, despite some tentatively encouraging remarks by Phoumi on reforming police, that he believes it either safe or wise for him to set army or country free from increasingly heavy-handed grip of Col. Siho. Without Phoumi, however, likelihood of violence as accompaniment any govt reorganization increases sharply.

8. We of course will continue and increase efforts sustain Souvanna’s will, urge his supporters to give him real assistance and seek ways depress what we sense as growing hunger of extremists on both sides closing in for kill. We estimate long run chance of success about even, if we get through present critical period. If Souvanna goes, we believe clearcut forceful reorientation preferable to temporizing measures aimed at trying hold National Union Govt together under leaders who unlikely have authority to do so. Latter action almost assuredly would offer less chance of success than present govt and would only draw US into closer commitment to less plausible combination.

9. There follows listing of what we see as possible political and military difficulties arising in near future. Proposed US action appropriate to each situation will be discussed in subsequent message.

a) Souvanna may suddenly resign or be otherwise removed from scene leaving Souphanouvong and Phoumi as legal successors until a further lawful succession is determined.

b) Souvanna may resign or be removed consequent to an outbreak of hostilities between two or more of the factions trying to move into predominant position politically and physically.

Either of these events might well precipitate any of the following; however, if current tensions increase, any of the following might also occur independently:

a) Pathet Lao may increase test of harassing attacks on neutralist military forces, heightening severely the already strong neutralist feeling of being compressed between conservative and Pathet Lao pressures.

b) Neutralist elements may begin actions of reprisal and terror against conservative forces, particularly DNC, leading to increasing violence in Vientiane and other towns and to rapidly escalating public fear.

c) As a consequence of (a), Kong Le forces may suddenly move against Pathet Lao, in desperation and with predictable result of further reducing effective military and political support of center.

d) Pathet Lao may declare coalition at end and carry on govt their zone without any reference to Vientiane—here most immediately critical question would be neutralist political and military status in Phong Saly and Plaine des Jarres. Phoumi might do the same.

e) Neutralist forces, probably led by Kong Le, may attempt take over Royal Capital or, less likely, Vientiane in effort to establish either nucleus of government in Luang Prabang or total government in Vientiane.

f) Phoumi’s group, rebelling against Phoumi, may attempt to take over FAR from him and then govt as a whole.

g) Phoumi may lead attempt to take over total government.

h) Pathet Lao may mount a military move on Vientiane in attempt to take over country suddenly.

Without rehearsing evidence that leads us to consider all of foregoing as oppressive possibilities, we see two major problems resulting:

a) A political problem as to what govt and which groups to support.

b) A political and military problem as to how far this support should go, e.g., whether or not the US ought to activate military plans to assure retention by West of essential portions of Laos.

Unger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1762. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Paris, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
1. See footnote 2, Document 435.
2. In telegram 518, November 13, the Department concurred with Unger’s plans to “hold fabric Souvanna regime together and increase effectiveness Kong Le support to Souvanna.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1262)
3. In telegram 732, November 13, the Embassy summarized its contacts with the neutralists in Vientiane and assessed their views and personalities. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1362)
4. In these telegrams, November 10 and 12, the Embassy reported conversations with members of Souvanna’s staff and Souvanna himself in which the Lao officials painted a grim picture of the situation in Laos. The neutralist forces of Kong Le were in danger in throwing in their lot with the Pathet Lao and Souvanna was contemplating resignation because neither side would compromise. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1062 and 751J.00/11–1262)