Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

435. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)⁰

Washington, November 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Laos

1. Attached at Tab A is a message from Ambassador Unger assessing the current unsettled situation within the coalition government of Laos. The message is not alarming, but acknowledges the possibility that the Souvanna government may fall in the near future, recognizes no clear alternate leadership to carry on a neutralist orientation is available, and suggests the US should continue to try to hold the Souvanna leadership in place.¹ A follow-on message from Vientiane today quotes the French Ambassador Falaize as stating his views that the prospects of an early Souvanna fall are exaggerated.²

2. It is clear, however, it is time once again to evaluate possible unpleasant contingencies and devise alternate ways of meeting them. It is with this purpose in mind that my separate memorandum to you on contingencies and military responses was prepared.

3. I talked with Mr. Forrestal this afternoon to get a feel for his current thinking and that of Governor Harriman’s. The major points thereby developed follow:

a. Harriman and Forrestal feel the concern about Laos stems primarily from military sources in Vientiane. They are particularly heartened by Ambassador Falaize’s views and Forrestal is passing that message into the President this afternoon to give some balance to what otherwise seems like a serious situation.

b. State has asked the UK to request the Soviets to have their Ambassador in Vientiane reassure Souvanna of Russian support while at the same time calming down the Pathet Lao. This is the President’s idea and Harriman feels it will be rejected by the Soviets.³

c. Harriman feels the best immediate course of action is to assist Unger in propping up Souvanna and encouraging increased support for him by Phoumi and Kong Le. An approach will be made to Kong Le for this purpose shortly, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by Colonel Law [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

d. State will attempt to expedite ICC investigation for VM presence at Sam Neua and Tchepone without waiting for the Lao Investigating Commission to act.

e. Harriman and Forrestal recognize the need to approach the Russians on the question of Viet Minh presence and use of the Panhandle corridor. They have been fended off within State by the argument that the Cuba question has priority. They are determined to press this issue, and soon.

f. State is busy devising alternative governments which we might support in case Souvanna falls and a partition results. One alternative, reluctantly agreed to by Harriman, is to support a Phoumi administration and rally as many Vientiane neutrals and Kong Le sympathizers as possible. The second alternative is to exploit the reported conversations between certain FAR generals and Kong Le neutralists looking toward formulation of a combination neutral-right wing government that would exclude Phoumi. No one is particularly optimistic that the latter solution is a practical one.

4. Reiterating his remarks of two weeks ago, Forrestal said Governor Harriman and he continue to be worried with the lack of a composite picture of how we are doing in South Vietnam. They are considering the idea of sending a three man team to South Vietnam to assess the situation on the ground. Current thinking has the head man as either Mr. Hilsman or Mr. Rostow, accompanied by Forrestal and a representative from the JCS.

WHB

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos #2, 7, T–265–69. Secret. Taylor initialed the memorandum.
1. In addition, in telegram 729 from Vientiane, November 12, Unger proposed to seek early discussions with Souvanna and, if useful, also with Kong Le within the “context of finding means to hold fabric of Souvanna regime together and increase effectiveness of Kong Le support to Souvanna, rather than throwing U.S. support to Kong Le as leader.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–962)
2. Apparent reference to telegram 739 from Vientiane, November 14. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1462)
3. In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, November 14, Forrestal stated that he understood “that the President is still concerned about the spate of gloomy reports from Vientiane,” and that the President had asked Harriman that morning “to get the British to press the Soviets to buck up Souvanna and exercise more control over the PL.” The JCS and the Department of State were exploring alternatives “short of intervention” if Souvanna eventually resigned. Forrestal asked Rostow’s Policy Planning Council to contribute their thoughts. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/62–12/62)