Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

409. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, July 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Post-Geneva Laos Planning

1. Since the Geneva Accords are due to be signed on 23 July, there is considerable agitation on our side to get organized in Laos. The matters to be resolved of particular military interest are:

a. Withdrawal of Viet Minh and MAAG personnel.

b. Establishment of a French military mission whose missions are compatible with our objectives (train properly organized military and police; positive influence on Souvanna).

c. Support of FAR until demobilization and integration are accomplished.

d. Institution of an intelligence collection effort so that we will know what the Communists are doing and to what extent Viet Minh withdrawal has been accomplished.

2. As you are aware, some thought has gone into these and related problems in the past nine months, but much of the work is incomplete. The SEA Task Force has remained aloof from the Laos situation and the staffing is being done on an ad hoc basis. Forrestal and Cross (Laos Desk Officer) are now in Vientiane to coordinate ideas and approach with the Country Team, but, as you will see below, certain urgent issues lack sufficient definition for a firm decision. Governor Harriman’s return next week probably will quicken the pace.

3. State has provided a draft planning paper on the subject of Viet Minh withdrawal from Laos, and has forwarded it to Geneva for Governor Harriman’s comment.¹ It recognizes the possibility that the Viet Minh will pull out or disappear before ICC arrangements are set up for observing the withdrawal, but that some time will be needed to verify they have gone before we withdraw the MAAG. On this premise, the plan provides for:

a. Obtain the full 75–day period allowable by the Accords for withdrawal of the MAAG forces,

b. Collection of intelligence regarding the Viet Minh withdrawal, and

c. Contingency plans if we are not satisfied with the Viet Minh withdrawal.

The 75–day withdrawal period is a maximum based on time to determine the withdrawal routes and establish ICC teams at withdrawal points. In coordination with the Canadians we would try to assure that these functions take the full 30-and 15–day allowable periods. We would then utilize the full 30 days permitted for MAAG withdrawal.

The planning paper also recommends a comprehensive intelligence collection plan, utilizing all available sources. It provides for discussion with Canadian and Indian ICC missions on the question of how they plan to obtain information on which to base initiation of investigations provided for in the Accords to monitor the withdrawal process.

I have made arrangements to obtain this paper from State and will probably have a copy on Friday.²

4. Washington interdepartmental discussion is under way to formulate a detailed plan of procedures to govern withdrawal of MAAG personnel, to include formulation of contingencies based on Communist response to the withdrawal requirement. This paper will be based in part on the MAAG Laos operation plan. State estimates this paper will be in draft form on Monday, 23 July. The details of the MAAG plan will be included in the Southeast Asia contingency plan briefing which you will receive from the Joint Staff on Monday.

5. The French have been very slow in working up the details of their military mission. You will recall that they were pushed firmly by the DOD/JCS group, led by Bill Bundy, which went to Paris in late June. Those talks revealed U.S.-French differences as to the size of the integrated military force, the future police organization, and the French mission. These questions remain unresolved.

6. The whole question of U.S. assistance to the Souvanna government remains indefinite because Souvanna has not been prepared to discuss the subject in detail during his present visit in France. The tentative U.S. concept was transmitted to Vientiane on 17 July for Country Team comments.³ It is anticipated that this will be the key point of discussion with Souvanna during his visit to Washington commencing 26 July. As part of this over-all problem, but not specifically cited in the outgoing telegram, is how and to what extent the United States will provide military assistance, especially to the FAR, during the period before demobilization and integration are accomplished. The procedures and time-phasing of this process is an internal matter which has not yet been discussed and decided upon by the new government. The U.S., lacking definitive talks with Souvanna, has been unable to produce a firm plan of action. The recent decision to increase manning of the military attache office in Vientiane anticipated the attaches taking over a major part of the military assistance function. Admiral Felt has indicated disagreement with this concept and made the following recommendations:

a. U.S. AID Laos take on responsibility for audit, accounting, and budget for defense support.

b. “Beefed-up” attache office should be looked to for increased intelligence coverage and as a means of liaison between Vientiane and Thailand.

c. A non-resident MAAG Laos consisting of about 80 personnel should be set up in Thailand, with headquarters at Bangkok and advance echelon at Udorn. The officer in charge would be entitled “Deputy Chief JUSMAAG Thailand.” This activity would perform MAAG functions of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt, and storage in Thailand and shipment to Laos. It would maintain liaison with U.S. AID Laos, and with the attaches in Vientiane. There would be no direct contact with the RLG, and there need not necessarily be a direct contact with the American Ambassador to Laos. Administrative support, as well as cover, would be provided by Chief JUSMAAG Thailand.

7. It is obvious that a number of key decisions must be made here in the near future to establish the character of our support for the anti-Communists in Laos. The procedures we decide upon will depend a great deal upon the impressions brought back by Governor Harriman next week, and the extent to which we can obtain decisions and guidance from Souvanna during his forthcoming visit. The agenda and back-up papers which will govern our talks with Souvanna are under urgent preparation and I have arranged to obtain a complete briefing book for your use when it is ready early next week. I foresee need for your participation in the up-coming decision-making and, if you concur, it may be advisable to make direct contact with State, through Alexis Johnson, soon after Mr. Harriman’s return. I will continue to monitor the progress at the working level.

WHB

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos #2, 7, T–265–69. Secret.
1. Also summarized in Fecon 980 to Geneva, July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1762)
2. July 20.
3. In joint State/AID telegram 75 to Vientiane, July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.0051J/6–1362)