Office of the Historian

408. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0

Washington, July 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Status of Geneva Negotiations
1.

It is hoped that the Geneva Accords will be signed sometime between July 19 and July 23. I understand Secretary Rusk will make every effort to be present.

If signatures are completed during this period, it is probable that the best dates for the Souvanna visit to Washington will be 26 and 27 July.

2.
Compromises which seem to have been reached on the two remaining issues1 involve:
a.
Lao action for integration and demobilization of armed forces will not be included in the Laos Declaration of Neutrality as originally pressed by the U.S. Souvanna will make a statement referring to the Zurich communique2 and his government’s position as presented to the King (which cite the need for integration and demobilization) prior to signature of the Accords. The U.S. will note the statement; the fact that it is made before signature will include it as a matter of Conference cognizance. (The new rationale on this matter is that the ICC would have difficulty detecting PL cheating on demobilization, but could easily see compensatory delay on FAR side which we might desire and encourage based on intelligence of PL actions.)
b.
The Plan on the question of SEATO protection is to include in the Lao Declaration a statement that Laos will not recognize protection of military alliances or coalitions “including SEATO” with a responsive declaration by the 13 other Conference participants. No independent action by SEATO Council Representatives will be required; this end-arounds Thai objections to SEATO response and possible amendment to the Manila Treaty. (All SEATO members are being queried on this procedure; initial reaction is favorable.)
3.
The need to line up Diem and Sarit remains. Diem’s objections revolve around RLG recognition of the DRV and RLG ability or desire to halt infiltration into SVN via Laos3 (Ambassador Nolting says real concern is that Laos solution will lead to discussion of a neutral Viet-Nam). Sarit is concerned with required SEATO action (now probably solved by new procedure) and lack of ICC authority over integration and demobilization. The U.S. is pressing both governments to accept the U.S. rationale that the current Laos arrangement is the best of two poor alternatives.
WHB
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos #2, 7, T–265–69. Secret.↩
  2. The outline of the negotiations for these compromises is described in Confes 1183, 1186, 1191, 1193, 1198, and telegram 27 to Bangkok, July 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–462 to 751J.00/7–962)↩
  3. Text of the communique, June 22, 1961, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1017–1018.↩
  4. The Embassy in Saigon reported that Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency and Assistant Secretary for Defense, expressed his government’s serious concern about DRV recognition and lack of guarantees for North Vietnamese withdrawal. The ultimate fear of South Vietnamese President Diem and his brother Nhu, according to Nolting, was that the United States would gradually move to a policy of neutralism for Vietnam. Nolting suggested that a letter from President Kennedy be sent to Diem to reassure him and win South Vietnamese cooperation at Geneva. (Telegrams 9 and 14 from Saigon, July 3 and 5; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–362 and 751J.00/7–562) A suggested text was sent to Harriman at Geneva who revised it to make it more specific. Harriman urged that the revised text be sent. It was presented to Diem on July 10. (Fecon 930 to Geneva, Confe 1197 from Geneva, telegram 28 to Saigon, and telegram 35 from Saigon, July 6, 9, 9, and 10, respectively; ibid., 751J.00/7–562 to 751J.00/7–1062)↩