Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

392. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, June 7, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Laos Planning

As you know, the meeting scheduled for this afternoon has been postponed and no new date has as yet been set. Secretary Rusk has still not gotten together with Governor Harriman or Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, and I think it most important that this be done before we go back to the President or even a meeting with the principals. I am working on the problem now.

I would like to see a meeting on Saturday¹ similar to the one we had last Saturday morning² if the State Department can be pulled together tomorrow. If that can be done, the meeting with the President could be rescheduled for Monday or Tuesday.³

In the meanwhile, I wonder if we couldn’t draw the attention of the Secretary of Defense to the problem of planning for a U.S. reaction to possible enemy moves in the near future.⁴ It seems to me that the debate has centered too much around future contingencies which are very hard to grapple with.

Would it, for example, be worthwhile to put to Secretary McNamara Governor Harriman’s short-term political objective and ask the Secretary’s opinion on military action in support of this objective without sliding off into future problems? The question might be framed as follows:

Assumptions:

1. The political objective of the United States is to maintain the uneasy cease-fire and to create as favorable conditions as possible for negotiations for a government of national union.

2. General Phoumi and his colleagues may obstruct negotiations in such a way as to tempt the PL/VM to mount another action similar to Nam Tha (i.e. an attack on Attopeu or Saravane).

3. The PL/VM may themselves make unreasonable demands with which the United States could not agree and seek to bolster these demands by increased nibbling at FAR positions.

4. Negotiations currently under way may be interrupted by Souvanna Phouma’s return to Paris at the end of this month, thereby eliminating whatever control he may still exercise over the PL/VM and increasing the risk of a slow escalation of activity of the PL/VM against FAR positions.

Questions:

Are there any military moves which would be designed to deter the enemy from undertaking the activities described in the above assumptions? For example,

(1) Should the helicopter air lift available to General Tucker in support of FAR activities be substantially increased?

(2) Would it be feasible to increase the tactical air support available to the FAR by putting in more aircraft, preferably piloted by Laos but under the control of General Tucker?

(3) Need we improve U.S. air strike capability in Thailand?

(4) Are there sufficient U.S. forces in or available to Thailand so that the enemy would be convinced that we are prepared to take limited action in Laos in support of the cease-fire?

(5) Have we selected targets for possible air strikes by U.S. forces against PL/VM bases of supply in Laos?

There are no doubt other questions which you might be able to frame, but I think we could channel the Pentagon’s thinking usefully if we could provide this kind of hypothetical guidance which, up to the moment, State does not seem to have developed for administrative reasons. What do you think?

Michael V. Forrestal⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/6/62–6/12/62. Secret.
1. June 9.
2. June 2; see Document 384.
3. June 11 or 12.
4. Writing to Rusk on June 6, U. Alexis Johnson informed him that “the apparent understandings” of June 2 had come “undone.” They were rejected by McNamara on the grounds that Laos planning must be on an “all or nothing basis.” Either the United States moves in for the specific purpose of engaging in a decisive battle with the North Vietnamese or it remains out of Laos altogether. According to Johnson, Defense wanted to obtain from the President a decision that would place in the hands of the field commander the prerogative to escalate directly from limited military occupation to a major international war. Clearly, Defense was unhappy at the thought of U.S. forces having to remain for an indefinite period in the Mekong Valley. Johnson stated that while it was difficult to argue with Defense on military grounds, the President must not be faced with such a categorical choice. (Memorandum from Johnson to Rusk; Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Laos Conference, June 1962)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.