Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

364. Message [text not declassified] to Director of Central Intelligence McCone⁰

Vientiane, May 13, 1962.

[document number not declassified] For McCone [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

1. Have discussed questions posed ref¹ with best informed members Embassy, MAAG, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The judgments set forth in this message are my own, although I believe they would generally coincide with consensus here.

2. Re Para 1 ref, although I have not had the opportunity of probing this question with any Laos (there is now little exchange between Laos and Americans except at the formal diplomatic or military levels) there is unanimity among U.S. personnel to effect that Phoumi’s military position within Laos has not suffered. Lao believe that the defeat resulted from the enemy’s use of overwhelming Viet Minh and Chicom forces not from Phoumi’s Generalship. There is an overtone of blame laid to the Americans. Phoumi’s political position tho somewhat weakened by loss U.S. aid remains little affected by Nam Tha except insofar as the entire RLG structure is weakened by the exposure of its military impotence. Phoumi’s stock no more than abreast falling market. Above estimates Phoumi’s political military strength made without observing repercussions of implementation Deptel 987² which arrived this morning. Regardless of nature these effects, the above estimate academic. If Phoumi submits to pressure he obviously becomes diminished figure. If he resists, which seems most likely immediate reaction, he will probably become Lao hero until further military blows bring down entire RLG structure.

3. There is only one logical and likely political successor to Phoumi, Phoui Sananikone, if he would serve under current circumstances. This is not due to Phoui’s present following or political machine but simply from fact that, short of total P.L. victory, the only force likely upset Phoumi is the U.S. We have long ago chosen Phoui as the preferred successor to Phoumi in interim govt. Therefore short of Souvanna settlement, Phoui would succeed. It would be illogical for us to exert pressure to topple Phoumi without making sure of his successor. On military side, there are several candidates—Ouan Rathikone, Kouprasith Abhay, Bounpone, Hounpanh Bounthieng and Oudon Sananikone. Of these logical candidates would be Ouan who combines less than complete dedication to Phoumi’s cause with best field command capabilities. For these reasons plus his popularity in army he would also be most likely.

4. Re Para 2, nil effectiveness is Gen. Tucker’s estimate remnants of Nam Tha forces. Rest of FAR must be measured against their opposition—see Para 5 below. Various measures could be taken to increase their effectiveness. A change of leadership, MAAG assumption FAR logistics, foreign combat support units such as artillery and commo and extensive foreign encadrement of combat units. Any one or all of these would surely make FAR more effective. All these measures would not serve to make FAR sufficiently effective in time probably allotted to exceed or equal present capability of enemy. The addition of tactical air on a sufficient scale whether in form volunteers or baldly U.S. might combined with other measures above weigh balance.

5. Re Para 3 ref. Detailed analysis relative strength present opposing forces on 7 principal fronts leads to conclusion enemy could defeat FAR on all fronts within 2 weeks. Although FAR better than twice size enemy regular forces, FAR not better than numerically equal to enemy on any one front. This apparent paradox due dispersal more than half FAR to guard against small bands roving P.L. guerrillas who employed in classic support role to regular forces. Even where FAR numerically equal to enemy, latter has wide qualitative edge, almost entirely due to presence Vietminh as cadres and units. It hardly needs to be repeated that whereas FAR could give good account against PL–KL, presence Vietminh strikes terror. Effect Vietminh not only psychological: They are superior Asian troops who press home coordinated attacks with great skill and disregard for losses. Follows brief analysis each front (excluding Nam Tha province which no longer defensive factor:

A. Luang Prabang. Clockwise semicircle from North to South. Present forces equal—five battalions each with no Vietminh presently on line. In 10 days enemy could easily add 2 Vietminh battalions from Nam Tha area plus one from Xieng Khoung. Logistic build-up 2 weeks. No friendly capability reinforce. Estimate loss of Luang Prabang in 2 weeks from go ahead with probable warning to friendlies thru troop movements on Routes 7 and 13.

B. Vang Vien/Nam Lik. Present disposition—Enemy 4 battalions plus irregulars, no Vietminh. Friendly 3 battalions—plus one tied down against flanking irregulars. Enemy reinforcements—2 of Siho’s 3 BNs in Vientiane area. No enemy logistic build-up required. Warning of enemy reinforcements from Meos. Enemy breach Nam Lik defenses—1 week.

C. Tha Thom—Enemy 3 BNs incl 1 Vietminh. Friendly 3 weak BNs with 2 more in Paksane. Enemy logistics build-up required. Breach Tha Thom—1 week.

D. Thakhek—Enemy 7 BNs including 1 Vietminh and one heavily encadred P.L. Friendly 8 BNs with no possibility significant reinforcements. This major enemy logistics area. Estimate enemy could take Thakhek in 2 days without warning.

E. Savannakhet—Enemy 4 BNs including Vietminh and PL/VM. Friendly 3 BNs and 1 BN minus. C.M. 15 shattered at Nam Tha scheduled refit at Seno. More than one month required for it become a factor. Estimate Savannakhet fall in 10 days including 1 week logistics build-up. Probable warning.

F. Saravane—Enemy 2 PL/VM BNs and 1 PL BN minus. Friendly 2 BNs with another 40 kilometers away. No additional friendly reinforcement available. Without enemy reinforcements, Saravane would fall in 4 days. No warning.

G. Attopeu—Enemy 2 PL BNs and 2 PL companies close to town plus unknown number additional troops from border area to East. Friendly 3 BNs. Attopeu an island in PL sea. No possibility reinforcements and troops know it. Attopeu falls in 2 days with no warning.

6. Above para discussed with and concurred in by CH/MAAG and staff. Elaboration of gloomy picture gives force opinion that small measures conceded as price Phoumi capitulation (Deptel 987) would have no appreciable effect on outcome if PL/VM decide to move. Direct U.S. air and ground intervention as price Phoumi’s effacement and Govt reorganization would make harsh sense to Laos and might appeal to Phoumi’s patriotism tho this quality doubted in some quarters.

7. Re para 4 ref answer to this depends entirely on value PL/VM place on retaining Souvanna as magnet favorable Lao and world public opinion. Enemy could easily add a few VM battalions as substitute for KL forces with little change in time tables set forth para 5. Nam Tha attack may have been signal for other similar thrusts and decision to take over Laos by force rather than by politics. More likely it was display of strength to RLG and U.S. to bring Phoumi to bargaining table with hat in hand. It certainly renders Souphanouvong counsel predominant in setting terms which probably will harden. In taking Nam Tha action PL/VM willing accept grave risk causing Souvanna drop out of running. This would indicate willingness have ball bounce either way. Believe would still prefer political solution but not at cost sacrifice position of strength. Dispositions cited para 5 indicate preparedness switch to other tactics almost without notice.

8. Unconventional warfare assets in North Laos have capability harass enemy extensively in that area and ultimately cause large diversion of troops. Unfortunately they cannot compensate for FAR fragility on main fronts and adequate enemy front-line stockpiles, particularly if enemy decides to strike swiftly. If tatters of cease-fire hold during rainy season, unleashed tribal guerrillas in North could significantly weaken enemy front-line strength. UW assets in center and South require much more development to match this capability and threat to cities in South will persist.

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos # 2, 7 T–265–69. Secret.
1. In the reference telegram, May 11, McCone asked [text not declassified] Vientiane, for [text not declassified] appraisal of the effect of the Nam Tha military reversals on Phoumi’s military command and political position; could RLG forces be made effective; did he agree with the view in Washington that “Communist forces” were capable of additional operations of the Nam Tha level of success; and what were the consequences of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam’s apparent disregard of Souvanna Phouma? (Ibid.)
2. Document 361.