307. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
1290. Reference: Embtel 1285.1
Forrestal and Sullivan have just returned from visit with Phoumi in Savannakhet where latter was taking three-day sojourn in company several close military cronies (including Generals Bounpone and Bounthieng). During course visit, they had three lengthy conversations, first and third with Phoumi alone, but second at dinner which included most of military group. Although it would be rash predict consequences this visit which extended over better part two days, it is clear that Phoumi at least has no illusions re substance US position nor unanimity with which it being espoused by all elements US Government. During first two conversations he argued in considerable detail against US policy and urged its reconsideration. However, during third and final talk he said he accepted fact that US position would not change. He indicated he understood that consequences of refusing to accept our policy would be a withdrawal of all military support and that this could occur in fairly near future. He also indicated he understood decisions were up to him. He said he would consult further with his friends assembled in Savannakhet, return to Vientiane March 16 for discussions there with his govt and then make his decision known to us sometime in next few days.
He was informed that Harriman will visit Sarit in near future. (He also received message from Sarit during course his stay in Savannakhet, probably telling him same thing.) He said he welcomed opportunity meet with Harriman; but asked that meeting be scheduled either March 20 or preferably March 24, since he would be meeting with all his senior military commanders during “armed forces” period March 21 through March 23.
Choices available to Phoumi in making his “decision” presumably run entire gamut from complete abdication to going into bush as guerrilla leader. However, only prospect persistently held out to him was acceptance position in Souvanna govt as result sincere, serious negotiations. This prospect was presented to him (and to his Generals at dinner conversation) as only realistic choice which avoided his own personal destruction and probably ultimate destruction non-Communist Laos. It [Page 654] was also described as best opportunity for Phoumi group continue pursue anti-Communist policies by political rather than military means.
Phoumi’s main preoccupation seemed to be the maintenance of some legal basis for the power to protect himself and his friends if he cannot have Ministry of Defense. This concern was reiterated by two of his Generals in side conversations.
While visibly shaken by sum total these talks, Phoumi retained his composure throughout. All discussion remained on amicable plane and even when he was told we were prepared abandon him completely if necessary, he did not lose equanimity. He did, however, fidget considerably during more strenuous phases discussion and appeared thoroughly exhausted at conclusion final meeting. (He attributed this to fact he and his Generals had stayed up until 2:00 am discussing dinner conversation they had just completed with Forrestal and Sullivan.)
He said that he appreciated the opportunity of having a lengthy discussion of the rationale of our position in terms of the international situation since such a discussion made it far easier for him to deal with his own people.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1562. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Bangkok, and to Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Moscow, and Seoul and niact to Tokyo for Harriman.↩
- In telegram 1285, March 16, the Embassy suggested tentative dates for the Harriman-Phoumi-Sarit meeting. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1662)↩