306. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
1274. Embassy telegram 1247.1
During past week Ambassador, DCM, CHMAAG, ARMA, Sullivan, Forrestal, and various Emboffs conducted co-ordinated series of conversations with leading Lao personalities in effort persuade them to go along with Souvanna solution. Main thrust of US line has been to point out to RLG and pro-RLG figures that definite opportunity exists for Phoumi and themselves in Souvanna coalition, and both their own futures and future of Laos could be best served by such settlement.
Figures spoken to include following: Phouangphet, Somsanith, Dr. Oudom, Thongsing Phabmixay, Inpeng, Sisouk Na Champassak, Bouavan, Pheng Norindr, Nhouy, Gen. Bounthieng, Khamphan Panya, Leuam Insisiengmay, Gen. Kouprasith, Touby, Phoui Sananikone. Lesser fry, both civilian and military, also given word on more informal basis. Chilliness in Lao-US personal relations noted in Embassy’s A–782 has apparently worn off, and most Lao military and political figures were easy to talk to, maintaining current policy differences and difficulties over aid suspension should not affect personal feelings or relations. Nearly all were agreed peaceful solution mandatory, but little consensus as to best way to reach such solution or even that such solution possible.
General reaction among military to our approach has been almost completely negative. Citing precedent of latter half 1960, FAR leaders believe Souvanna’s coming to power will mean governmental inability to handle PL and steady undermining of FAR. US assurances of continued existence, at least for while, of FAR and continued US support for FAR considered insufficient. Although not stated as such by any FAR [Page 652] leader, it evident only assurance that would really appeal to them would be promise of intervention by US troops should Souvanna solution start to turn sour for them.
Civilian reaction more varied. One body of opinion, generally supporting current RLG line, is based on firm distrust of Souvanna and people around him. In addition, points are made that in last analysis, Lao cannot be expected to defend themselves against Communist, especially with Souvanna in charge; that King-and-Councils scheme is best way out; and that US aid cutoff will only make Lao dig in heels harder. When shown basic inconsistency between professed desire for peaceful settlement and refusal to accept Souvanna, reaction this group is relapse into fatalism, “If we must die fighting Communist, then so be it.” Supporters this line include Phouangphet, Thongsing, Bouavan, Nhouy, Leuam, and Touby.
Other civilian body of thought is prepared to go along with Souvanna. However there little indication anyone is willing to take any action to bring about Souvanna settlement. Main argument is that while many would accept Souvanna, Phoumi never will. Closely associated with this position is theory that many would support Souvanna but they are afraid of what Phoumi and Siho would do to them if they made their opinions known. Interesting side reactions in this group are relief that US now appears to be following single, clear policy, and some doubt, however, that aid cutoff is best way to achieve US aims. Like pro-RLG civilian group, would-be Souvanna supporters state aid cutoff may make RLG dig in heels and may even give Phoumi a good pretext to stir up popular feeling against US and for RLG as protectors Lao sovereignty and independence. Supporters this line include Dr. Oudom, Inpeng, Sisouk, Pheng Norindr, Nouphat, Khamphan, and Phoui. Position of Somsanith, who has proved weather vane in past, not yet clear.
Comment: We are impressed at how generally accurate Phoui’s prediction (Embtel 1247) has been of Lao reaction to our approaches. While reaction thus far has been spotty and not very encouraging, it not yet clear what effect time and sinking-in process will have toward changing or perhaps reinforcing present opinions of Lao political and public opinion leaders.
Copies of all memcons being pouched.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1062. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Baguio for Ambassador Brown (who was attending the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference), and to Bangkok, London, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Geneva for Fecon, Moscow, and New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 1247, March 5, Brown reported a conversation that he and Sullivan had with Phoui Sananikone who was adamant in his belief that Phoumi would never accept a government under Souvanna. According to Phoui, Phoumi had no rivals in the RLG, the Army was solidly behind him, Boun Oum was uninterested, and the majority of the National Assembly were intimidated by Phoumi and would vote against a government under Souvanna. The only way to change Phoumi’s mind was through Sarit and an offer of a U.S.-supported plan for the defense of Thailand. Nonetheless, Brown proposed to proceed with his plan to attempt to convince RLG officials to pressure Phoumi to join the Souvanna coalition. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–562)↩
- See footnote 9, Document 300.↩
- Despatch 171 from Vientiane, March 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/3–1362)↩