Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, February 24, 1962, 3 p.m.

1214. For Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Refs: Embtels 1141,¹ 1212,² 1213,³ and 1208,⁴ Deptel 704.⁵

Souvanna asked me to call 1030 Feb 24. He had just seen Phoumi for half-hour during which following transpired:

1) Phoumi stated Souvanna could not be PriMin because he could not control Pathet Lao. Souvanna replied he had never claimed to control PL except in places where he had some independent force. He pointed out that Phoumi with 70,000 armed men could not control PL and it was unreasonable to expect him to do it without any forces.

2) Phoumi made no proposals of his own on Cabinet composition, but criticized slate Souvanna had given him Feb 22 (Embtel 1208) on two grounds:

a) Center was unbalanced in favor of Xieng Khouang and

b) Sisoumang and Quinim could not be accepted in govt because of their pro-Communist leanings. Souvanna assured him that they were not pro-Communist.

3) Souvanna gave Phoumi list contained Embtel 1212. Phoumi made no comment. I do not know whether Souvanna told Phoumi this list was agreed with us.

4. Phoumi then presented his proposal of a govt of six councils presided over by King (Embtel 1141). Souvanna told him this was new proposal which he would have to consider and discuss with Souphanouvong.

Souvanna said a) this interview confirmed reports he had received after Hin Heup that Vientiane had not really intended to carry out their agreement to accept him as PriMin, b) his next move would be to return to Khang Khay and discuss with Souphanouvong the list “agreed” with the Western Ambassadors Feb 23 and Phoumi’s proposition. If Souphanouvong should accept Phoumi’s proposition, and it was conceivable that, with some adjustments, he might, all would be well. If he refused this proposition, but accepted the Feb 23 Cabinet slate, Souvanna would then inform Phoumi that this was his final proposition. If Phoumi refused to accept it, he would then go to Kina and advise him of situation. We agreed that Western Ambs would then follow up with demarche and action contemplated Deptel 704, and that his and our actions must be fully coordinated. c) Souvanna requested U.S. meanwhile to withhold any further pressure or sanctions on Phoumi, which I promised to do. I said I would try to discuss his revised proposal with Phoumi, but we agreed this unlikely have any effect.

I told Souvanna that we were greatly encouraged by our talk with him Feb 23 and that we could support slate we there agreed.

Souvanna will return Khang Khay Feb 26 and said he thought he could have answer as to Souphanouvong’s reactions by Feb 28.

I told Souvanna that Soviets were aware in general of our agreed plan of action and told him of my conversation with Scorucov (Embtel 1213) in which I had told him we were greatly encouraged by our talk with Souvanna Feb 23 and stressed importance of Souphanouvong’s agreement to Souvanna’s revised proposal. I said I had been anxious remove any Soviet suspicion that we were trying to separate him from Souphanouvong and to impress on them importance of Souphanouvong’s agreement to Souvanna’s revised proposal. I had asked their help in getting agreed position upon which we could act. Souvanna said, “You have done well.”

I said I had suggested to Scorucov division of responsibility, with U.S. handling problem of Defense and Interior with Phoumi and Soviets handling question of balance of center with Souphanouvong and that I thought Soviets might be helpful to him if he needed them. He said he would invoke their help if necessary and would show them his revised list.

I reminded Souvanna that he had said he would sound Phoui out on willingness to serve in Cabinet. Very reluctantly Souvanna said, “I will see him again.”

Comment: Souvanna’s attitude was entirely matter of fact. He seemed to understand and fully accept plan of campaign outlined Deptel 704 and agreed that his forthcoming demarches to Phoumi and King must be fully coordinated with Western Ambassadors. I gained impression that he had a sneaking feeling that Souphanouvong might possibly be prepared to do business on basis of Phoumi’s council proposition and he indicated no doubts about his ability to sell his revised governmental slate to Souphanouvong. He referred to it more than once as something agreed with us. I told him we had reservations about practicability of Phoumi’s council proposal and King’s willingness to serve, but if it were acceptable to all three Princes and King, we would also accept it.

I nevertheless feel strongly that Souphanouvong will reject Phoumi’s council proposal and seek to make undesirable modifications in formula of Embtel 1212. I stressed as strongly as possible both to Souvanna and to Scorucov that we cannot act effectively unless we have a satisfactory proposal agreed by both Souphanouvong and Souvanna.

Re Deptel 762. In light of foregoing including Souvanna’s specific request that we withhold further sanctions on Phoumi pending outcome Souvanna discussions Khang Khay and fact that I am still convinced (Embtel 1204, FOV–5234, para 5, and FOV–5236) that Phoumi will not agree to any proposal for government under Souvanna except possibly under most extreme pressure, I have no suggestions as to pressures on Phoumi to try to get his agreement to Souvanna’s revised slate before latter’s return to Khang Khay. I think we have reached point where we can only go to bat with Phoumi once and then we must do it with full force. In my view, Souvanna’s agreement alone to a reasonable proposal does not give us the basis for such action. We must have assurance Souphanouvong’s agreement and in terms of obtaining this Phoumi’s prior acceptance would probably be counterproductive. I do not think we can avoid fact that responsibility for bringing Phoumi around to a reasonable settlement agreed by Souvanna, Souphanouvong and ourselves in fact rests on us.

I will be sending thoughts on timing and nature of pressures we could bring to bear on Phoumi when proper time comes under schedule contemplated Deptel 704.

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–2462. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to London and Paris, and to Geneva for Fecon, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for POLAD, and New Delhi.
1. In telegram 1141, February 9, the Embassy reported a conversation between Phoumi and Hasey on that morning in which Phoumi told Hasey that a government of national union under Souvanna was impossible. Phoumi asked the United States to be more “open-minded” and suggested as a solution a government of six councils under the King. Phoumi favored the “council solution,” but thought that de facto partition might be more feasible. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–962)
2. In telegram 1212, February 23, Brown reported that he, Falaize, Addis, and Morris had met for 2 hours with Souvanna who was in Vientiane. Together they had prepared a revised coalition government acceptable to Souvanna who promised to discuss it with Souphanouvong. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–2362)
3. In telegram 1213, February 24, Brown reported a general discussion with Soviet Charge Scorucov on Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–2462)
4. In telegram 1208, February 22, Brown reported that Souvanna had produced a tentative cabinet slate, which he had not shown to Phoumi. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–2262)
5. Document 291.