Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, February 4, 1962, 5:05 p.m.

699. Embtel 1102.¹

Consider we should withhold February deposit pending developments, particularly Phoumi’s attitude on acceptance President’s letter.² Effect making deposit at this time would be to cause allies, Soviets and Lao themselves to question our determination carry through on peaceful settlement since it widely believed that Phoumi using Nam Tha incident to delay negotiations again.

Believe you should strongly remind RLG that its actions now involve all of us and that major decisions should be discussed with you in advance. While we can support Boun Oum/Phoumi in not negotiating under fire believe they were foolish in not letting Souvanna come to L. P. to see King.

We discussed with British here your and Addis messages concerning divergence of views on military moves by FAR.³ British concern and their role as Co-Chairman in working toward peaceful settlement point up necessity taking British views into account in determining extent of restraints we place on FAR. If British judgment widely at variance from ours, it is doubly difficult for them convince Soviets our good faith in handling Phoumi. Suggest you read detailed report of Roberts’ talks with Pushkin which we have asked British to let Addis make available to you.⁴

Still consider you should dissuade Phoumi from re-enforcing Nam Tha. It can do little good and possibly much harm and we cannot condone his unilateral decision against MAAG and your advice on this type of action which may broaden conflict irreparably.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851J.10/2–462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Cleveland and Rice, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Geneva Fecon, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 1102, February 4, Brown suggested that “in view of the comparative reasonableness” of Phoumi in the last 2 days, the United States should “quietly make the deposit” for February and use the March deposit as a possible economic sanction. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 278.
3. These differences were highlighted in telegram 1089 from Vientiane, February 2. The Embassy summarized them as follows: the British Ambassador in Laos and his military advisers did not consider FAR defense by maneuver or probing in force as legitimate, regardless of the extent of an enemy buildup or the fact that the enemy was engaged in similar activities on their own initiative. The problem, the Embassy continued, was complicated by the “almost pathological personal opposition to and distrust of Phoumi” by the British. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–262)
4. The U.K. report of Roberts’ conversation with Pushkin, February 5, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 2/1/62–2/19/62.