287. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
2109. I saw Pushkin this morning and carried out instructions Depcirtel 1348.1 He launched into long harangue, essence of which was that action at Nam Tha merely reply to offensive actions of RLG and that there was no connection between this and negotiations between Princes. There had been numerous military actions launched by [Phoumi] Nosovan particularly whenever there was prospect of any progress being made at meetings. US had military personnel in a position to observe these actions and must be well informed about them. Soviet Union stood for strict enforcement of cease-fire but only language Nosovan seemed understand was to reply to his actions with greater force. He was bitter about Nosovan whom he said he knew well. He made agreements and then immediately broke them and obviously did not want to negotiate. He had refused negotiate even before Nam Tha incident. Pushkin made reference to fact that there were Chiang Kai Shek troops still in Laos despite our undertaking to see that they were removed. He emphasized we should draw no connection between negotiations and Nam Tha.
I said that quite apart from whatever views he might hold about Nosovan and past developments in Laos, and I pointed out we were aware of many initiatives from the other side, he must realize difficulty for US in trying to bring pressure on RLG at time when major offensive was going on which was well known and publicized. We had public opinion to take into consideration and could not use our influence effectively under these conditions. He said we had far greater means of pressure than even we appear to realize but had not used it. He referred to our giving check for four million dollars to RLG simply to get Boun Oum [Page 612] to Geneva. I said it seemed pity when we appeared so near solution after such difficult work that we should fail over matter like this. I expressed hope despite what he had said they would use their best efforts and help us. He said they had already helped us possibly more than they should. He gave no undertaking whatever to take any action but I believe he was impressed by argument that we had problem of public opinion.
Roberts seeing Pushkin later this morning.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–362. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane.↩
- In this circular telegram, February 1, the Department instructed Thompson to take up the matter of Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attacks on RLG forces in the provincial capital city of Nam Tha. Thompson should state that the attacks endangered the continuing negotiations between the Lao Princes for a peaceful settlement in Laos. The United States could not put sufficiently strong pressure on Boun Oum and Phoumi to negotiate in good faith when their forces were under attack. In Vientiane, Brown was to stress to Phoumi that he had himself to blame for the attacks, which were probably a result of injudicious activities by FAR and his failure to agree on a coalition government. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–162)↩
- Telegram 807 to Moscow, February 4, suggested to Thompson that he and British Ambassador Roberts go back to the Soviet Government and state that the Soviet contention that there was no connection between Nam Tha and negotiations for a coalition government was unacceptable. Nam Tha was on an entirely different scale of military operations. The United States could not impose sanctions on the RLG that would weaken the RLG ability to defend itself. That is why the United States asked for, and thought they had obtained from Pushkin during the Laos Conference, a tacit understanding against such PL/North Vietnamese attacks. (Ibid.) In telegram 2126 from Moscow, February 5, Thompson reported that when Roberts made a renewed demarche about Nam Tha, Pushkin was even “rougher” than he had been on Thompson. (Ibid.)↩