242. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
824. For Assistant Secretary Harriman only from Ambassador. Reference: Deptel 535.1
I greatly appreciate your 535 which I think completes the framework of policy within which I am to operate by confirming that we are willing to dispense with Phoumi if necessary to get a coalition government. I appreciate also the very full authority given me and do not feel that I need anything further for the moment. I consider my instructions consistent with the policy set forth in your 535.
I agree that renewal of hostilities or any effort at formal partition would almost certainly require commitment of US forces at some stage, even though not necessarily heavy fighting, unless we would be prepared to accept military defeat of the FAR and effective military control by the enemy of all of Laos except a few of the large cities which the enemy might prefer not to attack.
The present uneasy stalemate and de facto partition might be maintained. But this would be at the option of the other side and could also be upset against our wishes by Phoumi.
A coalition government would almost certainly avoid Laos being overrun militarily by the other side. But given Souvanna’s weaknesses and that of other conservatives likely to be in the government, it would be no guarantee against conquest sooner or later by subversion and/or perhaps terrorism. (cf: SNIE 53–3–61)2
Thus to avoid a situation in which the other side could at any moment confront the President with the choice with which we do not want him to have to be faced, we must go for a coalition government, even if it is less satisfactory than we would wish, and will in all probability be a weaker instrument than we would like upon which to rely to prevent Communist takeover.
I do not think that Phoumi will negotiate for or agree to a coalition government headed by Souvanna under present circumstances if he can possibly avoid it.
For sixteen months, ever since August 1960, we have been trying in various ways and under widely different circumstances, to find a solution [Page 537] of the Laos problem through some combination of Phoumi and Souvanna and to avoid a clear cut choice between them. They could, if both were willing and adequately supported, be a very effective combination. To this day, however, our efforts have been unsuccessful. The reasons for this failure have differed on each occasion. Some have been our fault. Some have been caused by obstinacy of the other side and their greater willingness to accept the risk of military action. But the pattern of failure is so consistent as to suggest that the obstacles to success of their marriage are fairly fundamental.
A basic fact now (for a complex variety of reasons) is that Phoumi wants no part of Souvanna. Nor does the King, but this is less important. Moreover, Phoumi does not believe in a government of national union under Souvanna and including the Pathet Lao, especially when we will not insist on his having Defense or Interior. It is just possible that we can force him into it. But he will be an unwilling participant.
Nevertheless, we must, and I will, push this solution for all it is worth. We may succeed.
But in maneuvering or forcing Phoumi into a coalition, I may have to use such measures as will diminish or even effectively destroy Phoumi’s personal influence, or lead to his resignation, or both. I cannot use pressure effectively unless I know that we are prepared to accept this if necessary and thereafter to rely on the best deal we can make with Souvanna, Phoui and others. I interpret my instructions, plus your 535 as giving me this authority.
Whenever possible, I will send information Department before acting drastically.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1061. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.↩
- Document 241.↩
- SNIE 53–3–61, September 28, “The Situation and Short Run Outlook in Laos.” (Department of State, INR Files)↩