Office of the Historian

241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0

Washington, December 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

535. For Ambassador only from Harriman.

In your 8111 you raised difficult hypothetical question of what actions we would take if Souvanna stuck on package unacceptable to us or RLG and King refused to agree to package we found acceptable. The most immediate question is whether Phoumi can ever be induced to negotiate in good faith. Implications of these questions of course go to heart of problem we face in Laos. Directly stated the problem is to find Laos solution which would not involve on the one hand putting in US forces or on the other allowing Laos to be overrun in the absence of these forces. It is clear that all “solutions” (such as partition) which envisage military action ultimately would require putting US forces into Laos. It is also clear that if full scale hostilities break out again in Laos and we do not put in forces, Laos would be overrun. Our policy then must be to avoid facing the President with either of these extreme alternatives. This concept has been behind instructions you have been receiving and is the reason why we have been trying to provide you with as much flexibility and authority as we can.

I would like to have your thoughts and recommendations on any other measures we can take to carry out such a complex task. To achieve this objective we must be prepared consider drastic steps such as bringing about Phoumi’s departure from Govt. Particularly valuable would be your judgment as to whether any of your instructions are at variance with this policy. Please cable urgently if you feel that you need further authority.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–961. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Anderson and Steeves, and approved by Harriman.↩
  2. Dated December 6. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–661)↩