14. Summary Record of Meeting0
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- General Lemnitzer
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- Asst. Secretary of Defense Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Walter Rostow, White House
- Mr. Bissell, CIA
- Mr. Bohlen, State Department
- Mr. Parsons, State Department
General Lemnitzer was requested to open the meeting with a brief exposition of the military situation. He discussed the fighting around the Phou Khoun road junction and the prospective offensive, launched February 6, to retake the Plaine des Jarres from the west and the southeast.
The Secretary then discussed our proposal for a political solution in Laos, including its relationship to the military effort and to discussion with other nations, especially the British. The Secretary mentioned that there were some subsidiary decisions required to assist military support of General Phoumi’s offensive.
On one such decision relating to the use of C–130 aircraft to lift supplies needed for General Phoumi’s offensive, General Lemnitzer stated that this airlift was essential to its success. Consideration was then given to possible Soviet responses to the use of C–130 planes into Vientiane. It was pointed out that the use of US planes would merely match the longstanding use of Soviet planes to airlift supplies to the Pathet Lao. Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Rostow were of the opinion that it would not matter much what was painted on the planes we used, and Mr. Bohlen thought the more critical moment in regard to a Soviet response would come if it appeared that General Phoumi was succeeding in his effort to recapture the Plaine des Jarres. Mr. Bohlen thought that this might be the moment for the President to address a message to Khrushchev on our proposal for a peaceful solution. In response to the President’s question, General Lemnitzer agreed (contrary to the opinion held by his representatives on the Laos task force the preceding day) that it would be feasible for the [Page 49] C–130s to lift supplies only as far as Udon in northeast Thailand, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Authorization was then given for these planes to fly to Udon.
Another matter requiring decision was the proposal to send in an additional nine training teams (three teams per month). The nine teams would amount to 72 persons in all, and their presence would enable the US to have one team with each battalion of the Royal Lao Army. Mention was made of the severe reduction in French training personnel, which made this step all the more necessary, although on the other hand, it would have much less cover than before the French reduction. The introduction of these training teams was authorized.
[paragraph (3–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
In discussing the package of telegrams constituting our concept on Laos,1 the President expressed particular concern in regard to the possible stationing of a SEATO force in Thailand. He set forth arguments on both sides of this matter, but preferred that we not proceed with this part of our proposal at present. The Secretary pointed out that other actions were possible to bolster our military posture as a means of improving the negotiating position. He mentioned in this regard the dispatch of fleet units on visits to Bangkok, etc.
During the discussion Mr. Bohlen indicated that if Phoumi’s offensive were succeeding, which was by no means to be taken for granted, then he could see a much better prospect for launching Neutral Nations Commission proposal, particularly in terms of Soviet acquiescence in it. It was pointed out that to wait that long would be likely to leave the initiative to others on the political front and that time was needed in any event to consult with other countries, persuade the Lao to adopt our proposal, and to get action. In the meantime, Ambassador Brown was already in Bangkok and needed instructions.
There was also discussion initiated by the President as to why we thought these neutral nations would accept membership in the Commission, as we proposed. Also discussed were the possibilities and timing of a broadening of the Boun Oum-Phoumi government. It was brought out that a government crisis now would make it impossible for the King and his government to launch the proposal for a Neutral Nations Commission, which, according to our plan, the US and others would publicly support after the King acted. There was indeed a possibility that the Lao themselves would wish the government to be broadened, but premature action and pressure might make it impossible to advance towards the peaceful settlement which we envisaged.
[Page 50]Turning to our concept telegram, the President read the text and, subject to a change in timing to defer SEATO action, approved it. The Secretary pointed out that this particular text might not be the one which we would wind up with after discussion with the British. We felt that we should talk to them right away, but the Secretary thought it likely that the British would not agree with anything which did not commence with a replacement of the Boun Oum-Phoumi government by one including at least Souvanna. It was the sense of the meeting that we should next talk to the British, and only later to the French, in view of the danger of leaks; at the same time the urgent need to dispatch our message to Vientiane was recognized.
The President inquired as to the status at Seno, where there had been a tense position between the Lao and the French. He was told that this seemed to have moderated and that we were pressing the Lao not to antagonize the French needlessly.
[1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified]
Before closing the meeting, the President reiterated that he wanted to be sure that the timing on SEATO action was changed before we sent our concept telegram.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–861. Secret. Drafted by Parsons. The meeting took place at the White House.↩
- See Document 15.↩
- Rostow prepared a 1-page summary of this meeting which emphasized decisions taken. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–861)↩