Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

13. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 3, 1961, 10:40–11:38 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown

The President opened the conversation by saying that he understood that we had been concerned about the morale of the Lao Army but that there had been some improvement in it recently and inquired whether this was correct. I replied that there had indeed been some improvement consequent upon the Army’s success in retaking Vientiane and also because of some improvement in organization and command which had been introduced by General Phoumi. However, my basic concern about the staying power of the Royal Army troops and particularly the quality of their leadership remained. When the Army approached Vientiane they had an identifiable target, the capital city was a stimulus. Now they faced a long period of battle over a wide area of the country with no end in sight. There were differences and factionalism in their leadership and a severe shortage of first-class officers. Morale could break easily in the face of reverses. In any event it was not realistic to expect that a total victory or indeed any satisfactory solution of the problem in the country could be found by purely military means.

The President asked what should be done. I said that some very constructive thinking had been going on in the Department looking towards bringing in a neutral commission to try to arrange a cessation of hostilities and to prove to the world, including the Communists, that Laos really was neutral, was not a military base and was not a source of hostile acts or aggression against the Communists but rather simply an independent Kingdom anxious to lead its own life in its own way.

I said I thought this would go a long way to cure the unfortunate differences of opinion which had arisen between us and the British and the French. I was particularly concerned about the difficulties with the British because if Ambassador Addis was to be believed, it had gone beyond a mere difference of opinion between friends as to the proper course of action and had reached the stage where the British had become suspicious both of our motives and of our actions and felt that we were concealing things from them, both in the realm of what we had done and what our intentions were. This I felt was a most unhealthy situation.

I explained to the President that I had a certain bias in approach to these problems because all my background had been in Europe and in international organizations with a European flavor and, therefore, he must appraise any of my judgments accordingly.

The President asked what our real differences with the British and the French were. I replied that they centered about a difference in the concept of neutrality and more specifically in attitudes toward Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi. They were prepared to go much farther with a neutral Laos accepting aid from the Soviets and having Pathet Lao in the government and not taking an anti-communist posture than we would. They felt that the only hope of uniting the country was to support Souvanna Phouma, and the British at least were willing to accept Pathet Lao in the government. They agreed that this was a risk, but felt that with proper care and guidance, one or two communist members in the government could be kept from doing too much harm. The alternative would be civil war and, in their view, a greater risk.

I said I thought that their attitude might be colored to a certain degree by the fact that they are not Pacific powers and have no real responsibilities there whereas we have great responsibilities there. They tend to think of everything in terms of what its possible impact might be upon their position in Europe and elsewhere and therefore come out with a different emphasis than we.

The President indicated his concern about the military situation in view of our long lines of communication, the easy availability of supplies from Communist counties and the nature of the terrain. He also expressed concern about the differences between ourselves and our Western allies and indicated sympathy to the idea of a political approach through the neutral commission that we were considering. He expressed some skepticism, however, as to whether the Communists would accept this in view of their favorable military position.

I explained to him that in our program we were trying to implement the concept expressed in his inaugural that we should be ready to negotiate and yet at the same time be in a position of strength. Our program included proposals for certain actions by SEATO including a suggestion of stationing an American unit in Thailand thus indicating the determination of SEATO to be ready for action if peaceful measures failed. The President asked what my personal opinion of this was. I said that I had some reservations personally about the balance of advantage in stationing an American unit in Thailand. It was of course vitally important to stiffen the resolution of the Thais and to give them a sense of American support. Against this must be weighed an appraisal of the effect of such a move upon the Soviets or Chinese Communists and upon our Western allies and the neutrals whose support we were seeking to elicit by our package approach.

In the discussion of the military situation I mentioned my concern at certain moves which we had made and which had been proposed by our military such as the provision of T–6 aircraft and consideration of the use of napalm and other bombs. I said that it seemed to me unwise from our own interest to make moves which in themselves were not particularly effective but which could be seized upon by the other side as justification for increasing the tempo and level of their own activities and which would certainly be considered by neutrals and our Western allies as being unduly provocative. If there was to be an escalation in the level of military activity, I would hope that it would not be initiated by us and that the onus for it could clearly be placed on the other side. Therefore I felt it was very important that any moves in the military field should be thought through very carefully in terms not only of their immediate usefulness but in terms of consequences which they might set in motion and that they should be undertaken only if we were fully prepared to accept and meet those consequences. My own hope was that the fighting could be kept in the framework of Lao against Lao even if it took a lot longer to achieve our objectives.

The President asked me what kind of men Souvanna, Phoumi and Boun Oum were. I described Phoumi along the lines of Hasey’s character sketch contained in Embtel 1412.¹ I described Souvanna as a highly cultivated man, conscious of his royal blood, a sincere patriot, basically anti-Communist, possessed of an infinite capacity for self-deception, convinced (wrongly) that he commanded the devout support of 90% of the Lao people, confident that if he could get the Communists in his government he could handle them and keep the country from their clutches, wholly incapable of organizing or running a government, too disposed to compromise, underestimating Communist persistence and ruthlessness, unwilling to believe that his half-brother Souphanouvong, or indeed most of the other Pathet Lao leaders, were really Communists.

I described Boun Oum as a Lao Falstaff, popular in the South and in other places among the simple people who were impressed by his royal blood, the fact that he was the second personage in the realm, and the fact that he mingled with the people many of whom felt that he had supernatural powers. At the same time he had a widespread reputation for venality and was not either very intelligent or very decisive. So far as the government was concerned, he was a figurehead.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, Bangkok Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, 350 Political Affairs—Laos (C), 1961. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Brown, who was in Washington for consultations. The conversation took place at the White House. The time of the conversation is from Kennedy’s appointment book. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)
1. In telegram 1412 from Vientiane, January 25, Phoumi was described as a devoted family man, who suffered from insecurity about himself and was suspicious of others unless they were part of his loyal entourage. Phoumi was characterized as ambitious, unscrupulous, hard-driving, egotistical, moody, proud, a fast-talker, but a slow thinker who was nonetheless intelligent. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.521/1–2561)