Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

132. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Capabilities of the Lao Army

1. This brief estimate of the current capabilities of the Lao Army is furnished in response to your query during the NSC Meeting on 29 June 1961.¹ It is based upon information received from Chief, MAAG, Laos this morning.

2. At the time of the cease-fire on 3 May, it was estimated that the enemy could advance on any front without encountering effective Lao Army resistance. This evaluation was based on considerations of leadership, training, status of equipment, and the will to fight. Since the cease-fire, progress has been made in training and the correction of combat losses in personnel and some equipment. The increase in the effectiveness accruing from this progress to date is insufficient, however, to justify too much optimism in view of the leadership and supply deficiencies which still exist, the lack of noticeable improvement in the Lao will to fight, and the continuing unimpeded movement of troops and supplies from North Vietnam into areas of Laos under enemy control. The Lao Army without outside military assistance is not at the present time capable of more than delaying action on any front on which the enemy chooses to make an organized attack.

3. An intensive training program has been initiated since the cease-fire and Lao forces are undergoing training in Laos and Thailand. One infantry battalion has completed a six-week period of unit training in Thailand and two additional battalions are now in training under this program. Artillery training has been initiated to convert all batteries from French to U.S. techniques. Two 105–mm howitzer and one 75–mm howitzer batteries have already been trained; an additional 75–mm battery is presently in training. Thirteen pilots are now undergoing training in Thailand; an additional fifteen are scheduled to commence training about 1 September. Tactical training of deployed battalions is being conducted wherever feasible and has resulted in increased individual proficiency in basic soldiering and some progress in noncommissioned officer leadership. The principal result of this tactical training has been position improvement, increased small unit tactical proficiency and improved maintenance of individual equipment. Officer and noncommissioned officer schools have not been approved by the Lao Ministry of Security on the basis of the pressure of other commitments. Specialist training has been generally neglected for the same reason. In the area of intelligence training, a Royal Lao Military Intelligence School has been established to train additional intelligence officers. Regional intelligence schools are now being organized at regional headquarters.

4. With regard to logistics, the status of supplies has improved during the past two months except for certain critical items which have been requisitioned on an emergency basis. Equipment is in from poor to fair condition. The maintenance capability of the Lao Army is improving slowly but is hampered by insufficient trainees, low technical ability, language difficulties and an excessive backlog of equipment needing maintenance.

5. In the area of organization, the most notable improvement has been made in intelligence organization. Officers trained at the U.S. Army Intelligence School on Okinawa have been placed in key command and intelligence positions. New tables of organization make provision for adequate intelligence staffs.

6. Leadership remains weak despite strong efforts by the Chief, MAAG, for improvement. Leadership and proficiency training of officers is generally neglected although one such school is planned in one military region.

7. In summary, although progress is being made, the Lao Army is not yet an effective fighting force. The correction of the basic deficiencies in leadership and motivation are prerequisite to reaching an acceptable level of effectiveness and will take time and the full cooperation of the Royal Lao Government and Lao Army. Present deployments necessary to confront opposing forces on the avenues of approach to critical terrain decrease the Lao Army capability for internal security against irregular opposing forces and hamper training and rehabilitation. Improvement of the overall combat capability of the Lao Army in the face of the present missions for internal security and for defending the cease-fire line can be expected to be an uphill battle for some time to come.

L.L. Lemnitzer²

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 7/61. Top Secret.
1. See Document 127.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.