Office of the Historian

131. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State2

Geneva, July 6, 1961, 3 p.m.

Confe 339. From Steeves. During translation break in conference yesterday Ambassador Wang Peng Nan approached me with obvious show of cordiality saying he now back from Warsaw and would like to talk to me about “Chinese-American relations.” I passed the remark off by saying that the one comment which I would make on the subject of our relations was the one that had to do with this conference saying that we were not progressing very rapidly.

He said he agreed and then said “What do you Americans want out of this conference?” I told him that should be rather obvious from what I had said in my statement at the conference yesterday. I gave him a very brief resume again of our insistence on impartial machinery with adequate terms of reference in order to insure that people like the Viet Minh would be restrained from interfering in Laos as they had done for so many years.

He obviously wanted to be affable and not engage in an argument and halfway agreed with me that adequate controls were probably necessary and that we should discuss the matter further.

Ambassador Harriman and I feel that some continuing cautious contact with Wang on the subject of the conference would not be out of place. Would appreciate Department’s comments promptly.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–661. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Hong Kong and Warsaw.↩
  2. In Fecon 231, July 6, the Department agreed that “cautious contact” with Wang Ping-Nan was not out of place, but there should be no impression given of negotiations. Contacts should be guarded, casual, and limited to conference issues. (Ibid.) In Confe 357, July 10, Steeves reported he had another brief talk with Wang Ping-Nan in which the Chinese delegate suggested in an almost affable approach that all the Chinese wanted out of the conference was a show of progress. Wang suggested that the easy question, i.e., neutrality, should be discussed first and the progress made would help to resolve the more difficult issues. Steeves countered by emphasizing the issues of equipment and instructions to the ICC and Wang “mildly agreed” that an effective commission was desirable. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–1061)↩