Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

122. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 26, 1961, 10 p.m.

Confe 287. From Harriman. Confe 278.¹ After discussing invitation Souvanna visit US (reftel), I sounded out Souvanna on as many subjects as seemed feasible, considering he was obviously tired after long day including reception, and planned early departure following morning.

1. Souvanna did say flatly Phoumi was best of Vientiane group and if he quit army, Souvanna would have him in his cabinet. He didn’t want any military men in govt. It was men around Phoumi who caused trouble, they didn’t want to lose posts they had. Souvanna dismissed Boun Oum as not really being interested. He described Phoui (and his tone was unfriendly) as “ambitious,” supported only by his family. Confirming meeting reported Confe 267, Souvanna said had called in Phoumi but gave no meaningful details.²

I said highly advisable have “strong men” like Phoumi on right to help stand off pressure PL. That always his policy, Souvanna replied, recalling when he in Vientiane last fall he sought Savannakhet group return before he brought PL back into govt.

2. Souvanna repeated several times three Princes had to get together in Phnom Penh or Laos to decide on PriMin. Only after they had agreed Souvanna should be PriMin would he go see King in Luang Prabang. If he went before, might leave impression he was soliciting job. He had no ambition, as head of family related to royal family it wasn’t his duty try bring peace to country.

3. King could appoint provisional govt without going through Assembly. Assembly could stay on shelf until dissolved 90 days before elections which should not be held till country was normal. I recalled he had said might take year normalize situation. Souvanna replied year would not be necessary once inventory of men and arms completed. His idea was to put armed forces all three sides into single army. That would provide info on men and arms, following which govt would demobilize excess. As neutral country, Laos wouldn’t need “very large” army. If things went well, conditions might be settled to extent honest elections possible before end of year.

4. Re my question French presence, Souvanna noted communique proviso and said this was something would have to be worked out bilaterally with France. I commented departure uniformed American military mission personnel would be easy but how about other side. Souvanna said no Vietminh troop units as such present, only “technicians.” I said like artillerymen. He said they all Lao—his “nephew” was in charge. (Under questioning he said nephew named Tiao Lath (phonetic), who had been senior year Lycee Pavie and former boy scout. Laughingly Souvanna added many artillerymen, also ex-scouts, presumably fled Vientiane with Lath.)

5. Talking of Lao neighbors, Souvanna said neutral Laos need expect no trouble from north. In spite of my reference to example Cambodia, he maintained Vietminh transit through Laos could be stopped once Laos neutral.

Heightened DRV/SVN tension coincided with troubles in Laos. Souvanna thought Thailand would be neighbor more difficult to have friendly relations with than Vietnam. Thailand plagued by 8 million Lao in northeast many of whom wanted rejoin Laos. Recent troubles there described by RTG as Communist plot just to cover up. Souvanna denied any desire or interest stir up such feelings, said once Laos neutral and again peaceful with development prosperity many Lao in northeast Thailand would desire return Laos. For that reason, in Thai interest keep Laos in state unrest.

6. I said we felt would be in Laos best interest have strong ICC controls for several years. Souvanna, recalling he had asked ICC to leave in 1958, said he wanted ICC to stay on a while but must be under orders RLG. ICC teams should be sent out from Vientiane on RLG request to investigate specific incidents. When I pointed out under 1954 agreement teams were stationed at a number of points in countryside, Souvanna said experience had shown that certain team members had indulged in propaganda activities. I asked whether these were Indians or Poles. Souvanna (first closing open terrace window) lowered voice and said “Poles.”

7. I indicated US only interest was support for a really neutral and independent Laos and coalition government if it had those ends. We could help particularly in economic development program. Souvanna said that was essential. PL breeds on discontent. He aimed at getting villagers to support him by doing something to help improve their standards living. If this done, nothing to fear from NLHX. He personally, when in Xieng Khouang and elsewhere, lived like villagers and soldiers. Too many people at top thought only of themselves. At another point, Souvanna recalled his brother Souphanouvong was author of Lao five-year plan, and said latter never against US economic assistance.

In emphasizing danger Souvanna faced from PL, I speculated that perhaps he might be succeeded by Souphanouvong. Souvanna said firmly this would never happen. He was beholden to no one. He had repeatedly said in Moscow and other bloc capitals that he was against communism in Laos.

Comment: Souvanna made a point of seeing me without any of his associates. He seemed more relaxed last night and made fewer sweeping statements. He attempted to justify positions he took. He admitted there would be difficulties with the Pathet Lao and spoke of ways he could protect his govt. While he showed his usual self-confidence, he appeared to be more realistic towards the difficulties he was facing.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J11/6–2661. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, priority to Vientiane, to Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
1. In Confe 278, June 26, Harriman reported that at the same meeting with Souvanna late in the evening of June 25, he renewed the invitation to the Lao leader to visit Washington. Souvanna, who was leaving the next morning for a 10-day stay in Paris, declined. Harriman reported that he did not twist Souvanna’s arm, but suggested that Gavin in Paris could raise the issue again if the Department wished. (Ibid.)
2. In Confe 267, June 23, the Delegation reported that Souvanna and Phoumi had a private talk. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–2361)