Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

121. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, June 26, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Laos and South Vietnam

The new version of Cottrell’s paper (attached)¹ focuses primarily on the implications of developments in Southern Laos for the defense of South Viet Nam. The paper is being submitted to Messrs. Johnson and McConaughy in the hope that they will send it to the Secretary for possible transmission to the President. Cottrell advises that a just-received message from Vientiane (2316)² makes similar proposals. I have not yet seen it.³

The Problem. The Communist military actions in Southern Laos which are the basis of Cottrell’s concern were, according to the attachment to his paper,⁴ undertaken in late April. (The paper does not indicate when they were concluded.) They were thus undertaken before the cease-fire (May 3) and we must have been aware of them at the time the President approved the recommendations of the Task Force on Viet Nam in mid-May. It is, therefore, rather difficult to make a case that we are faced by a new situation.

Nevertheless, there is genuine cause for concern. Following their military action in the area the Communists have been engaged in roadbuilding which, one must presume (though the paper presents no direct evidence on this subject), has been used as a cover for the extension and consolidation of their influence. The gradual takeover of Southern Laos would indeed make the problem of the defense of Viet Nam and Thailand much more difficult. We have looked upon de facto partition as possible outcome of the Geneva Conference. But both partition and a genuinely neutral Laos will be precluded if the Communists use a prolonged conference to consolidate their power in Southern Laos.

The Strategy. The Cottrell strategy is based upon the assumption that we can effectively employ the Communist tactic of a gradual military-guerrilla action and succeed, as they have done, in avoiding any strong counteraction. The following questions may be asked:

a. Is such a gradualist approach possible without provoking strong propaganda and military counter-moves by the Communists? (Cottrell’s argument is based upon the belief that the Chinese and Russians would be militarily deterred by the fact that they probably do not want to fight a major war in Laos (p. 6). But they would not face such a prospect unless the U.S. intervened or clearly committed itself to intervene.)

b. Do we have a very strong propaganda case against the Communists if we are forced to justify Vietnamese, Thai (and ultimately perhaps U.S.) intervention?

c. Would the Thai and Vietnamese commit forces to the proposed operation without a firm commitment in advance that the U.S. would intervene militarily if necessary?

d. Is it a good idea to involve the Vietnamese directly in the war in Laos? Such action would tend to merge the two wars on the ground and in Geneva.

e. From a military point of view, could an operation like that proposed by Cottrell succeed? A road may make a convenient boundary, but without much larger forces can boundary-crossing be effectively prevented?

All of these questions tend to force us back upon the fundamental question of whether the U.S. should itself intervene in Laos. Present planning for U.S.–SEATO intervention is based upon the assumption that there is a clear-cut violation of the cease-fire. It seems to me that we ought to broaden our contingency planning to cover the much more probable situation where the cease-fire is not clearly broken, but where the Communists nibble away at the non-Communist position. We need to decide at what point such nibbling will demand political and, possibly, military counteraction. Such planning should proceed urgently and be discussed with the President at an early date. We also need to improve our information on what is going on in Southern Laos.⁵

In conclusion, I do not believe that the Cottrell paper presents a very feasible concept, but it does raise the important question of whether we may not have to take military action if we are going to salvage even a partitioned Laos.⁶

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/2/61–6/26/61. Secret. Johnson was also the alternate member of the Vietnam Task Force.
1. See footnote 4, Document 120.
2. Document 118.
3. Johnson wrote an addendum at this point which reads: “now received and attached.”
4. Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/2/61–6/26/61)
5. Johnson wrote an addendum at this point which reads: “The Brown message from Vientiane has further information on this subject.”
6. Johnson wrote an addendum at this point which reads: “It is this general point that Brown’s message from Vientiane makes.”