Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva⁰

Washington, June 23, 1961, 1:14 p.m.

2222. Eyes Only for Harriman from the Secretary.

I was very much interested in your suggestion (Confe 210)¹ about the possibility of your having a quiet discussion with Chen Yi. I certainly share your feeling that we should attempt avoid unnecessarily strained personal relations with ChiCom delegation which might leave us at disadvantage in dealing with ChiComs as compared with attitude of other key Western delegations. Our posture should be polite and correct at all times. Nevertheless, while I believe a discussion between you and Chen Yi might be useful at some point in the Conference I rather doubt that it would be of particular benefit at this point, inasmuch as friendly delegations should be able to fill us in on Chinese attitudes. It seems unlikely that such a meeting could be kept secret, since the Chinese Communists might consider it advantageous as a means of increasing their prestige and making us appear weak and anxious, to leak the fact that you had taken the initiative to approach them. The repercussions of our taking the initiative for such a private meeting on our Asian SEATO allies as well as on the governments of the divided Asian countries would be adverse, particularly if there seemed to be no tangible advantage to us from the discussion. The Canadians and French who occupy far less important roles in the Far East than ourselves can hold such meetings with Chen Yi without these risks.

I would be glad to receive your further thoughts on this matter particularly if developments at the Conference should warrant our taking this significant step.

In meanwhile I suggest you and members your delegation gradually adopt a “correct” attitude in and out of Conference toward Chen Yi and other members Chinese Communist Delegation generally not taking initiative toward additional contacts but also not rebuffing any Chinese Communist initiative. However, if you feel it useful there would be no objection to testing Chinese Communist response by having Steeves make casual and informal approach to Wang Ping-nan in delegates lounge or any other such occasion where both happen to be present.²

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–361. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Martin and Bowles; cleared with Jenkins, U. Alexis Johnson, McConaughy, and Anderson (in draft); and approved by Rusk.
1. In Confe 210, June 17, eyes only for Rusk, Harriman suggested that he meet with the head of the Chinese Delegation, Chen Yi, through the good offices of the British to discuss Laos. Harriman noted that the Chinese and Soviet positions on Laos were “somewhat different.” (Ibid., 751J.00/6–1761)
2. In Confe 279, June 26, Harriman reported that he, Mrs. Harriman, and Steeves on the evening of June 25 introduced themselves at a social reception to Chinese Ambassador Wang Peng Nan, who was carrying on the U.S.-Chinese talks at Warsaw. While the conversation was nonsubstantive, the Chinese Ambassador remarked that at neither Geneva nor Warsaw were U.S.-Chinese relations improving, but he hoped that the United States would take the initiative to change that. Also at this meeting, Harriman shook Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s hand and exchanged a few words. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–2661)