Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

116. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 22, 1961, 3 p.m.

Confe 256. From Harriman for Secretary. It has become clear that Soviets by their statements and positions taken in Geneva are attempting to undermine and corrupt meaning of phrase “effective cease-fire” contained in Vienna communique. They have taken stand that:

(A) Pathet Lao is permitted mop up and eliminate all isolated RLG military units operating “behind lines” in areas which they claim to have “liberated” as an act of maintenance of law and order;

(B) Any effort supply or reprovision these units constitutes “provocation”;

(C) Any entry of RLG forces into positions which they did not physically invest at moment of cease-fire is violation and can be used (as in case villages north of Paksane) as justification for Pathet Lao attack to drive these RLG forces out of such positions;

(D) ICC can investigate only at points major concentrations opposing forces and not at any point “behind lines”. Therefore, ICC should not have equipment which would give it independent capability. This attitude towards ICC derives not only from Soviet desire permit Pathet Lao continue to improve their military position without interference by ICC, but also from their effort avoid precedents of ICC authority which they are unwilling to accord in future through agreements at conference.

They will continue to explain away every new PL violation with some new distorted interpretation which will make the cease-fire a meaningless farce.

Soviet interpretation of “effective cease-fire” is causing us difficulties here with such friendly delegations as Thai and Vietnamese, who are already grumbling that we have “lost” cease-fire issue, and with some press representatives who are asking why we don’t bring recent violations to attention of conference as I promised. I believe we can expect constant whittling away of RLG military positions which will accentuate the situation. There is little we can do here to bring situation under control except to make as many issues as we can devise, such as adequate equipment to ICC or to walk out. If we recess again on this issue it would seem that we would have to stick it out unless or until the cease-fire is unmistakably in force and ICC given effective instructions and tools. This risks permanent break-up of conference.

I feel strongly that arrogant attitude reflected in Gromyko’s note sent you in Confe 232¹ should be firmly answered. This attitude, if unchecked, I believe will have significant influence across the board in US and Soviet relations, specifically on such matters as Berlin.

I therefore recommend that either you send vigorous reply to Gromyko note or that Thompson make representations highest levels Moscow to hammer home this question of Soviet bad faith in cease-fire, or both.

It would be most helpful to have your thinking and guidance in how we handle ourselves here.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2261. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Moscow, to London, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane.
1. Gromyko’s reply in Confe 232, June 20, was in response to a message from Rusk; see footnote 2, Document 111. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union considered the Phoumi side responsible for the fighting in Padong. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2061)