Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, June 1, 1961, 8 p.m.

2183. For Secretary from Ambassador. Reference: Paris 5239 to Dept, 791 to Geneva;¹ Deptel 1311;² Deptel 1317 to Vientiane, Fecon 57 to Geneva.³

I fully realize force arguments contained reftels and that under circumstances they may be controlling. Confe 68⁴ not received here.

I would nevertheless urge that before deciding to rely exclusively on French for military training and support we take a most careful look at what they would be prepared and able to do.

Experience with French training Lao Army in past has been uniformly unsatisfactory not only because of inadequacy personnel and financial support but more importantly because of general patronizing attitude towards Lao and approach to training as being more designed train troops to serve under foreign officers than to be self-reliant leaders. MAAG, and I believe JCS, also feel many French practices outmoded and inefficient, particularly in crucial area of logistics. These considerations important in view essentiality having limited forces which will be allowed to RLG trained to maximum capability.

French would also have difficult legacy of dislike and friction on part most FAL and many other Lao including political leaders to overcome, based upon past unhappy experience and aura of colonialism. Our support such large French role here may consequently alienate many Lao.

I also wonder what reaction Thais would be in light recent French attitude SEATO.⁵

Question France becoming principal source materiel and equipment also raises serious problem since after several years’ effort and much expense we have almost completed equipment of FAL with entirely U.S. materiel.

To change back to French equipment would involve considerable waste, necessitate retraining troops to new equipment and considerable period of time in which FAL would be back in the situation we have striven to avoid of having two or more types of equipment, each of which has to be separately serviced and separately supplied with ammunition and spare parts.

Further question arises whether French primary interest would be in actually making Lao Forces best possible, or whether they would be mainly interested in maintaining prestige and political presence France in Laos.

From viewpoint military efficiency and local acceptability, our view is that training could better be accomplished by Danes, Swiss, Swedes or Indians with materiel supplied by U.S.

Message unsigned

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–161. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Saigon, priority to Bangkok, priority to CINCPAC for POLAD, and niact to Geneva for Harriman.
1. See footnote 2, Document 102.
2. In telegram 1311, May 30, the Department of State asked urgently for comments on telegram 5239 from Paris. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–3061)
3. See footnote 3, Document 102.
4. Document 102.
5. In telegram 2184 from Bangkok, June 3, Young stated that the Thais believed that the French military presence in Laos had actively favored the Souvanna-Kong Le group over the RLG and that France had purposely hamstrung SEATO. Young concluded that the Thais would consider the “salvaging” of French influence in Laos as a “very thin veil for US disengagement in Laos.” (Department of State, Central Files. 751J.00/6–361)