Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

103. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m.

US/MC/2

PRESIDENT’S VISIT

Paris, May 31–June 2, 1961

SUBJECT

• Wednesday Afternoon Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • President Kennedy
  • Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)
• France
  • General De Gaulle
  • Mr. Lebel (Interpreter)

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Laos

The President raised the question of Laos. In his opinion, the United States has made mistakes in the past. As a result, it is now in a difficult situation. There exists a commitment on the part of the United States and on the basis of the Geneva Protocols and of SEATO. This commitment must be taken into account. The U.S. Government has been seeking a cease-fire and neutralization of Laos. This, however, may no longer be possible. It would have been possible three years ago, but the situation is different now. The immediate question is what to do at the conference in Geneva.

General De Gaulle said that the situation is “compromised.” He does not wish to harp on the past; when it seems the U.S. had the unfortunate illusion that Laos could be made into something strong. In fact. Laos is an unhappy country with no unity, either political or national; it is, in fact, a nonentity which cannot be built up into anything at all. The presence of the U.S. in Laos brings with it Soviet intervention; in any struggle in Laos, the Soviets have the advantage because of their propaganda and because they have devoted efficient agents while we do not. Therefore, the situation is very bad indeed. The question is what to do. The best solution seems to be to encourage the King to form a government which would not be fully and exclusively Communist. It is clear that the Pathet Lao would be in the government as it is too late to prevent them from entering into one, but they might not be in such government alone. Souvanna Phouma should be encouraged. The French know him well. He is not a Communist. He is trying to use the Communists and the Communists are trying to use him but he is not a Communist himself and he has friends. He might be able to establish a government which would make Laos “more or less” neutral. It would be better if the West did not appear to apply any pressure, as by doing so, it would lose the last cards it has to play. Without doing it openly, it would be good to encourage Souvanna Phouma and to encourage the King to take Souvanna Phouma as prime minister. The Government will include Communists but will not be fully Communist. Moreover, the French are authorized by the Geneva Agreements to maintain some influence in Laos. They can have a small military advisory group and also teachers and technicians. No Laotian wants such French advisors to leave, and these can constitute a sort of listening post for the West in Laos.

The President agreed that Souvanna Phouma may be the best available solution even though obviously he is not a very good one. It may, however, be too late to hope that Souvanna Phouma will succeed in maintaining the sort of balance because of the imbalance in the military positions. This may make Souvanna Phouma a prisoner or, if this term is too strong, may place him under a great degree of control on the part of the Communists as a consequence of the military collapse of the Royal Army.

General De Gaulle said that this was indeed possible. He thought that at the beginning Souvanna Phouma might be very close to the Communists but then little by little he might be able to push them farther away—although obviously not very far away.

More generally speaking, Southeast Asia, and that applies to Laos, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and even Thailand, is not a good terrain for the West to fight on. The best thing to do is to encourage neutralism in that area, the more so that the Soviets themselves do not have any strong desire to move in. They will, however, tend to follow every time the West moves in.

The President said that the U.S. is faced with two problems, one of them being the commitment under the SEATO Protocols. Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower entered into such commitments. President Kennedy has reaffirmed them in the hope of arriving at a cease-fire. At the present moment, the prestige of the United States is engaged and if the solution to the Laotian problem is a Communist one, there can be grave repercussions not only in Thailand, in Viet-Nam, and in Malaya, but also in India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey—all the countries along the southern flank of the Soviet Union. It may have been unwise on the part of the United States in the past to have committed itself to this part of the world but the fact is that those commitments exist at the present moment and the question is how to disengage in the best possible way. Secondly, there are commitments also in regard to Thailand and southern Viet-Nam and, there again, it is difficult to avoid the consequences of such commitments. The President agreed that the Soviets may not seek a penetration in south Viet-Nam but the Viet Minh does and it is probable that it would have sought to penetrate into Viet-Nam regardless of whether the U.S. would or would not have been present there. The question is what to do in regard to Viet-Nam and to Thailand. The U.S. is seeking to help those countries, in particular through military training, and the question is not especially in regard to Viet-Nam whether such aid will be successful. It must, nevertheless, be tried as an abandonment of those countries by the U.S. would have repercussions elsewhere in the countries which were mentioned before and also in the Philippines, South Korea, and even Japan.

General De Gaulle said that he understood the difficulties with which the United States is faced. France was deeply engaged in Indo-China and had to leave that country under circumstances which the President undoubtedly remembers. Yet France has kept some influence in those countries, but she can keep that influence only because she does not undertake any military action, or any action in the military field, in either Laos, Cambodia, or Viet-Nam. It seems that to have an influence in those countries and to exercise a military action in them are mutually contradictory. In the minds of the people of that area, any military action is equivalent to a desire to rule them.

[1 paragraph (5–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Of course, it is not easy to change policies. Yet, it is not so difficult either, especially if it can be done in coordination with Nehru and with the Japanese. There exists a genuine Western influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans but in some areas the best way to further that influence is to seek neutrality even if that neutrality is only more or less genuine. In the countries of Southeast Asia the West can keep its influence only without military commitments, by extending its influence on a cultural plane and also by avoiding to give too much money to those countries. Money makes them corrupt and the governmental corruption makes government unpopular. This is what is happening at the present moment in South Viet-Nam.

The President said that the problem for the U.S. is that it has treaty commitments and has been identified with those commitments. If the United States withdraws, Viet-Nam and possibly Thailand might even collapse. It is true that these countries and especially Viet-Nam might collapse even without the U.S. backing out. We must, however, think of the consequences. The part played by those countries in regard to Asia is perhaps identical with the part played by Berlin with regard to Europe. Already the fact that the U.S. has not intervened in Laos has created great difficulties for us in the Philippines. If now we were to withdraw from Viet-Nam and Viet-Nam were to collapse, that could be taken as a precedent, especially if it were done voluntarily.

General De Gaulle said that he agreed with the President as to the difficulty of the situation. This difficult situation is due to past mistakes in policy. At the time when France withdrew from Indo-China, the ties of the countries concerned with the West were ties with France. After a military withdrawal of the French, those ties were little by little strengthened in the economic and the cultural areas. The U.S. unfortunately felt obligated to more or less replace France in Indo-China. This was not good and now we are suffering the consequences. France does not intend to repeat the mistakes of the past and feels that it will not intervene, at least not militarily and not at present.

The President said that the pressing problem is the Geneva conference. There we should try to obtain for Laos a government as good as possible, in the same sense in which President De Gaulle meant it. It is possible that the French presence in Laos can be helpful and that Souvanna Phouma who is friendly towards France, as he is not to the United States, may be the best choice. Two problems remain, however; first, that of strengthening the Control Commission, not only for the present but for the future. The insistence of the Soviets on the principle of unanimity within this commission renders the situation extremely difficult. Can one hope to see the Polish member vote with the others?

General De Gaulle said that the best thing would be to seek to go back to the 1954 Geneva Agreements. These were signed by everybody including the Chinese. It is moreover something which everyone understands. We should therefore seek to go back to it.

The President said that we would like to have a better functioning Control Commission but the best that we can do is probably to return to the Geneva Convention.

General De Gaulle said that such a course of action would have the added advantage of bringing India into the picture. An Indian is the chairman of the Control Commission, and moreover Mr. Nehru is personally interested in it. By returning to it we would be forcing India to take her responsibilities. This should be done without appearing to interfere.

The President said, however, that a return to the Geneva convention might be prevented by the Soviet insistence on the principle of unanimity within the Commission, where it is to replace the former procedure of a majority vote. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see what the Commission could do to prevent the collapse of the cease fire and the installation of the government dominated by the Pathet Lao. If this takes place, should we interfere in order to defend the Mekong River cities such as Vientiane or Sovannakhet or should we never intervene regardless of the circumstances?

General De Gaulle said that France would not intervene, at least not militarily. France feels that what the West should do is to encourage Sihanouk and also the King who is much more worthwhile to support than is the marshal. In any case France would not interfere militarily. (Note: It is not quite clear whether General De Gaulle meant at this point the King of Siam and Marshal Sarit.)

The President said that the problem was that if our enemies were sure that we would not intervene then there would be no reason for them to seek any agreement acceptable to us.

General De Gaulle said that if the West does not intervene, the Soviets may not want to intervene either, and that the situation would evolve in the direction of neutrality.

The President replied that there is no necessity for the Soviets to intervene as there is no balance in the situation of forces. If there were a military equilibrium, the situation would be different but at the present moment the Pathet Lao can occupy the Mekong River cities any time it wishes. Therefore, there is no need for the Soviets to intervene. The only thing which might be an influence for a better settlement would be the fear of an intervention on the part of the West.

General De Gaulle reiterated that we should not intervene and that France does not intend to intervene, at least not at present and not by military means.

President Kennedy said that we should nevertheless hold the threat of an intervention in order to bring the Chinese and the Soviets to an agreement. Otherwise, what there might be would be a Souvanna Phouma Government which would not last long and would be replaced by a Communist government under his half-brother or under someone else.

General De Gaulle said that he was stating his position on intervention to the President, but did not intend to say anything of the sort to the press and that we should try indeed to keep the opposition guessing. The only card for the West to play is that of Souvanna Phouma, although the General is under no illusions about the worth of the latter who nevertheless represents the only existing possibility. The alternative is military intervention but such a military intervention could lead only to a further deterioration of the situation, mainly for psychological reasons, and this, even in South Viet-Nam and Thailand.

The President said that the people of the area may feel, on the contrary, that if we do not intervene then they have reason for despair and ensuing weakness. However, it seems that the best thing to do is to try to strengthen the Control Commission and arrive at as good a government as possible.

President De Gaulle recalled the war France waged in Indo-China. He stated his feeling that a new war could not lead anywhere even if waged by the U.S. If the U.S. feels that its security or its honor compelled it to intervene, the French will not oppose such an intervention but will not participate in it, except of course if it were to lead to a world-wide war, in which case France would be always at the side of the U.S.

The President said that in the immediate future, the only thing to do is to try to coordinate in the best possible way the positions of the delegations in Geneva. He himself is extremely reluctant to think of an intervention in Laos, a country with only two air strips and no access to the sea.

General De Gaulle said that the situation might evolve differently in the future, when Chinese ambition will become more evident to the people of its area. The Chinese are greatly feared in Southeast Asia even by Ho Chi Minh. If their ambition becomes evident it may create a reaction and we may find allies on the spot. For the moment, however, the Chinese are not showing their ambition openly.

The President asked whether General De Gaulle thought that it was because of this fear which exists of the Chinese that it is the Soviets who have interfered openly rather than through the Chinese.

General De Gaulle said that there might have been two reasons for the Soviets to intervene directly, the first one being the one mentioned by the President and the second a Soviet fear of the Chinese. Everybody fears the Chinese; for example, there are practically no Chinese in Hanoi, only Poles, Czechs and Russians with a very, very few Chinese.

The President expressed the doubt that we would have enough time to wait for such a change in feeling and for any quarrel between the Communist rivals to become serious. This might happen at a time when the West has already been forced out of the area. The President reminded of the rivalry between Caesar and Pompey which came out into the open after the two generals had conquered their common enemies. For the moment then Communist rivals seem to be united by their hatred against the West.

General De Gaulle said that he was not certain that the situation was all that bad. The West still has many possibilities, as long as it refrains from military action. It still has influence. French influence had never been as strong as since the French armies had left the area. There is a constant demand for French teachers and specialists, and a constant increase in the number of students in French schools not only in South Viet-Nam but even in North Viet-Nam including Hanoi.

President Kennedy said that this might be because hostility towards the U.S. has replaced hostility towards its friends. If the U.S. is forced out, France may no longer appear as the lesser evil. The President further stated that he had visited both Saigon and Hanoi in 1951 and he saw the scope of the French effort. France had a lot of troops and good troops in Indo-China. He understands as a consequence that any intervention in that part of the free world have to be a major operation.

General De Gaulle said that such indeed would not be the case, and the worst thing that could happen to the West would be a military defeat. To sum up, General De Gaulle said that what should be used is careful diplomacy and to seek a return to the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The West should encourage Souvanna Phouma and Sihanouk and, without being obvious about it, the King of Thailand who would wish to play a more active part but is prevented from doing so by Marshal Sarit. Contacts must be maintained with Mr. Nehru because India, in spite of her poverty and her difficulties, is a genuine nation and the key to that part of the world.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters]

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1891. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. This discussion took place at the Elysee Palace. The master records of the President’s State visit to Paris May 31–June 3, are ibid.