466. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Conference with SEATO Secretary General
You are scheduled to receive Pote Sarasin, Secretary General of SEATO, at 4 p.m. today.1
Sarasin is an unusually friendly Thai official and far more restrained in his views than other Thai, especially Foreign Minister Thanat. I had lunch with Sarasin last Tuesday; and he said that in his opinion the main source of our current difficulties with the Thais is the fact that we failed to consult with them in advance of the withdrawal of the Marines from Udorn. As a result of this, according to Sarasin, a succession of other unrelated events (the Temple, Cambodian aid, etc.) became magnified out of proportion.
You may wish to give Sarasin a brief personal message to convey to Sarit, which would have the effect of enhancing Sarasin’s prestige and indicating to Sarit your personal concern over the difficulties which have arisen.
For example, you might describe to Sarasin in a general way the circumstances under which we withdrew the Marines. You will recall that, having put the Marines in, in response to the fall of Nam Tha, we were anxious to demonstrate rather quickly to the Soviets that we still wished to push the Geneva Accords to conclusion. If Sarasin were able to convey some of the atmosphere surrounding your decision discreetly to Sarit, it might serve to smooth ruffled feelings.
A cable came in last night which may confirm Sarasin’s identification of the troop withdrawal as the source of Sarit’s annoyance. Bangkok’s 585 is attached,2 in which Sarit has suggested the desirability of consultation on the withdrawal of the battle group presently near Korat.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Thailand; Southeast Asia Addendum. Secret.↩
- See Document 467.↩
- Dated September 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/9–2662)↩