467. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- US-Thai Relations
- PARTICIPANTS
- The President Mr. Pote Sarasin, Secretary General, SEATO
- Gov. W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Edward E. Masters, Officer-in-Charge, Thai Desk
[Here follows discussion of SEATO issues; see Document 36.]
Turning to the US military presence in Thailand, Mr. Sarasin said US forces had made a very favorable impact. The people liked the Americans and the government was deeply impressed by the fact that US troops arrived within 48 hours. This proved the US could and would come to Thailand’s assistance quickly in event of need. He said Prime Minister Sarit had asked him to convey. Sarit’s appreciation for the prompt US response to Thailand’s request for military support.
The President asked Mr. Sarasin to tell the Prime Minister that he regretted the fact that there had not been adequate time for full consultation before our Marines were withdrawn. The President said the Marines are an amphibious force which belongs at sea. These are special units which must maintain their flexibility. The Prime Minister should not believe that the withdrawal was in any sense a lessening of our interest or responsibilities in the area. If consultation was inadequate, this was only a mechanical failure and did not represent any US intention to disregard Thailand’s wishes.
Mr. Sarasin said our objectives in sending in troops were good and these objectives had been achieved. This movement showed the US could get in quickly. The Thai Government does not mind withdrawal of the forces; it hopes only that adequate consultation will be held before this takes place. Mr. Sarasin suggested it might be useful to issue a joint US-Thai communiqué at the time of withdrawal which would explain the purpose of the forces and emphasize their ability to return quickly if needed.
The President agreed that issuance of such a joint communiqué might be helpful. On the future of the US forces, the President said it [Page 969] might be useful to keep the Battle Group in Thailand for a little while until we see what happens in Laos. We will soon want to discuss this with the Thai Government to see what it thinks.
The President asked whether it would not have been possible to induce the Philippines to participate in the introduction of troops last May. Gov. Harriman explained that the Philippines offered to send troops if asked by Thailand, whereas Thailand said it would accept troops if offered by the Philippines. Mr. Sarasin observed that the Government of Thailand knew that movement and maintenance of troops would be expensive and wanted to save the Philippine Government the expense. He believed, however, that if the Thai Government had made a formal request the Philippines would have responded.
The President said he realized that the ICJ decision on the Phra Viharn temple, the unfortunate timing of the arrival of the T-28s in Cambodia, and other developments had created problems for Prime Minister Sarit. Regarding the ICJ decision, the President said that Dean Acheson, attorney for the Cambodians, is an independent figure and not a member of the Administration. The US Government was not involved in any way in influencing the ICJ decision.
Mr. Sarasin said his government understands the reasons for our military aid to Cambodia, but the people may not understand our motives. President Kennedy said the Cambodian Government released the news of the delivery of our T-28s before we could alert Prime Minister Sarit. The Cambodians probably hoped to play up these arrivals to cause problems in our relations with Thailand and South Viet-Nam. Mr. Sarasin said he did not believe the Government of Thailand actually feared Cambodia. It was only that there should have been earlier and more thorough consultation so the Thai Government could alert the people beforehand. President Kennedy assured the Secretary General there would be the fullest possible discussion in the future.
The President said Sihanouk is volatile and mercurial, but this does not mean we should not help him. Although we do not agree with many of his actions, we believe it is in the interests of the Free World for him to obtain military equipment from us rather than from the communists.
The President said he hoped the Thai Government and people would look at the satisfactory things that are being done and not over-emphasize the negative. The President asked Mr. Sarasin to tell Sarit that our assurances to Thailand, the Rusk-Thanat communiqué, the movement of US forces, and the planned logistics program all demonstrate our intention to continue to meet our commitments. Our main objective in Southeast Asia is for a strong Thailand, a strong South Viet-Nam, a neutral Cambodia, and, we hope, a neutral Laos.
[Page 970]In response to a general comment by Mr. Sarasin, the President said he would send the Prime Minister a letter covering some of the topics which had been discussed.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.92/9–2862. Secret. Drafted by Masters and approved by the White House on October 15. The meeting lasted until 4:42 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)↩
Text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 692 to Bangkok, October 15. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.92/10–1562)
Pote Sarasin also met with Rusk at the United Nations at 9:15 a.m. on September 29. Rusk asked if Thailand’s view of SEATO had improved. Pote Sarasin answered that it had not because the deployment of troops to Thailand was “more a bilateral than a SEATO action.” Rusk stressed the U.S. commitment to SEATO and, in response to Pote Sarasin’s fears about the future of Laos, noted that it “has not gone Communist yet.” The two men discussed Thai relations with its neighbors and U.S.-Thai relations. Pote Sarasin stressed the need for more consultation and expressed the belief that U.S. ground forces and the British air unit could be withdrawn. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
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