Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, June 8, 1962, 2 p.m.

2138. Deliver at Opening of Business. Department telegram 1366.¹Sukarno is almost at point of being willing to resume talks with Dutch but insisted this morning that Dutch position was not yet completely clear and that he was not sure despite US and U Thant assurances that Dutch were on record as being willing to transfer administration over WNG to Indonesia prior to plebiscite.

President who was in good mood put it this way. “The light is dawning but the sun has not yet come up over the horizon. It is not yet absolutely clear to me that Dutch are willing to do this.” He said further, “I am ready to resume negotiations the very moment I am satisfied on this point.”

I reviewed situation with him carefully and thoroughly, going back to Netherlands parliamentary discussion. When I stated (paragraph one reference telegram) that Dutch Government has committed itself publicly to negotiations on basis of Bunker formula, he stopped me, demanded, “Why can’t Dutch come out and say they agree in principle with the Bunker plan? What does this mean ‘on the basis of?”

We considered, I replied, that the Dutch had gone at least as far as the Indonesians. “What does acceptance in principle mean that agreement on the basis of negotiation doesn’t mean?” I asked, emphasizing that we considered latter as strong if not stronger commitment.

He asked me to repeat statement I had made. I read him paragraph one reference telegram word for word to underline point that I was giving him considered Department view.² He then asked to see statement which I handed him. He studied it carefully. Then he said, “You say the Dutch Government has committed itself publicly. When and where? I have searched and searched but find no clear public statement by the Dutch Government. If I have this, I am satisfied.”

I referred to statements in Parliament, plus assurances Dutch had given us as well as U Thant, called his attention to fact U Thant only two days ago had in effect made public assurances Dutch had given him, said I considered this at least equivalent to public statement by Dutch. I pointed out Dutch had internal political problems as did GOI What more did Sukarno want? I said I found it difficult to understand why he was unwilling to accept Dutch assurances through US and U Thant.

“Because,” Sukarno said simply, “I know the Dutch. I think they may be cheating you as well as U Thant.” He then reverted to statement he has made repeatedly over past months. That if US would give him assurance that Dutch would do this, he would accept it.

“I will give you my government’s assurance that Dutch have said so to us,” I replied, emphasizing again (because of presence of others) why it was impossible for one government to give unqualified assurances as to what another government would do.

Sukarno shook his head. “I have to be sure,” he said. “If you will tell me when or where the Dutch Government has said it would transfer administration to Indonesia prior to this self-determination business, I will authorize my representatives to re-enter talks tomorrow.”

Patiently I went back over same old ground. I pointed out that the Dutch had committed themselves to negotiation on the basis of the Bunker plan, that the Bunker plan clearly provided for what he was asking.

During course of discussion which lasted almost an hour, albeit punctuated by interruptions and considerable bantering, I made most points in reference telegram timely receipt of which was most helpful.

At one juncture, Sukarno quoted from paragraph 1 reference telegram the phrase “if satisfactory agreement can be found with respect Papuan self-determination.” What does this mean?, he demanded. This “if”, does this mean Dutch will insist on negotiating self-determination provisions before agreeing to discuss ways and means of transfer of administration to Indonesia?

In any negotiation, I pointed out, there were “ifs” on both sides. Bunker plan was no guarantee to Dutch that Indonesians would do what they wished. Similarly plan was no guarantee to Indonesians that Dutch would come to agreement. But in our view, although negotiations would undoubtedly be difficult, sincere and patient efforts by GOI could have no result other than one acceptable to Indonesia. I stressed that we considered time element would be on Indonesian side, provided talks were resumed in near future, making point re Dutch public opinion and diplomatic pressures building up on behalf peaceful settlement as talks proceeded.

One point in reference telegram I deliberately did not make at this time—paragraph 4—believing it wise to save argument of US prestige. There was no implication whatever in conversation that Sukarno was either rejecting idea resumption of talks or failing to appreciate US efforts. He is still suspicious, still fears that Dutch have something up their sleeves. And Sukarno is not alone in this—every Indonesian with whom I have recently talked, including such pro-American Indonesians as Minister of National Research (former dean medical college) Sudjono Posponegoro, has reflected same suspicion and uncertainty. There is general recognition that this is the last chance, that if misunderstanding should develop in early stage of talks and negotiations break down, war then becomes inevitable. This no one in Indonesia wants. At same time, there is increasing attitude of resignation so typical of Moslems—“If Allah wills it,” a shrug of the shoulders, “we will have to go through with it.”

Sultan Jogjakarta, Governor Sumarno, and four others were present during conversation. Comment follows immediately.³

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/6–862. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to The Hague and USUN.
1. Telegram 1366 to Djakarta, June 7, instructed Jones to “give the Indos final push necessary to bring them back to the negotiating table.” Jones should stress that the Netherlands had publicly committed to transfer before Papuan self-determination, that time was on Indonesia’s side, and that continued diplomatic impasse accompanied by military pressure would be contrary to Indonesian interest. (Ibid., 798.11/6–762)
2. Paragraph 1 of telegram 1366 reads: “Dutch Government has committed itself publicly to negotiations on basis of Bunker formula which provides, if satisfactory agreement can be found with respect Papuan self-determination, transfer administrative authority prior to actual self-determination exercise.”
3. Document 273.