Office of the Historian

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0

Djakarta, June 8, 1962, 5 p.m.

2144. Embassy telegram 2138.1 Deliver at opening of business.

Comment:

Sukarno appears to have point that there is no valid obvious reason why Dutch should not state publicly, as Indos have done, their willingness to accept Bunker formula.

There seem in sum to be three reasons why Indos hesitate now to resume negotiations:

1.
They want to be sure that if they undertake negotiations these will result in transfer of WNG to Indo under some set of conditions. While they have lately avoided calling this a precondition, I doubt that they will negotiate until Dutch have been committed to a “how” rather than “whether” position. They feel a new failure of negotiations would make war inevitable.
2.
The Indos consider that unless this is understood in advance, Dutch can and would walk out on some pretext, particularly if psychological and military pressures are relaxed as a means of providing helpful atmosphere for negotiations. We have done about all we can to persuade them that they are wrong about this.
3.
Sukarno has taken firm public position he will not negotiate so long as Dutch continue sending reinforcements to WNG. To get back from this limb he needs some help. I, of course, recognize difficulties this presents to Dutch, but Indos think Dutch public would be willing go further than Luns. They do not buy idea that Luns is held back from more moderate course for fear of hostile public reaction.

In my opinion President Sukarno is not stalling and would like to resume negotiations if given a peg on which to hang his hat in rationalizing a new posture before his people.

Therefore I doubt whether we can safely apply much more pressure on Indos without considerable risk to our future prestige. Should we press them to negotiations while they still have doubts as to Dutch sincerity, doubts overridden on the basis of our discounting them; we would have taken on responsibility which I doubt if we are prepared to carry out—namely to keep Dutch negotiating in good faith until settlement reached. No more could we guarantee Dutch that GOI in fact desires peaceful settlement, although I am convinced this is case.

[Page 603]

My understanding of what Sukarno wants before coming to conference table is Dutch public statement which, however worded, would do three things:

1.
Provide rationale for Sukarno with own people in agreeing to further talks.
2.
Provide justification for whatever action Sukarno might want to take should talks fail.
3.
Commit Dutch Government in eyes of own people, making it more difficult to arbitrarily break off negotiations once they have begun.
Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/6–862. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to The Hague and USUN.↩
  2. Document 272.↩