Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, May 17, 1962, 2:45 p.m.

1292. Embtels 2019 and 2015.¹ In order prevent further dangerous drift toward hostilities most important that we bring about early resumption talks. We cannot hope convince either Dutch or Indos of other side’s good faith which can only be revealed in course of negotiations.

Ambassador should use occasion his meeting Sukarno (Embtel 2019). to tell him that while we obviously not in position guarantee negotiations will succeed we do believe sincerely that there is reasonable chance that talks, once resumed, will reach successful conclusion.²

We base this on the fact that we have not had from Dutch any indication of any points with regard to such matters as adequate guarantees for the interest of the Papuans that we think are irrelevant to the Bunker proposals, within which a considerable number of details would have to be worked out. Further, you can tell Indonesians that we have strongly pressed the Dutch to tell us quite frankly whether they saw no chances of success within the four corners of the Bunker proposals; had they done so we would not be urging resumption of talks and would withdraw as third party. Dutch did not take such point of view. You can tell Sukarno my personal judgment is that Indonesian interests would be served by resuming talks, purpose of which would be to prepare agreed agenda for formal negotiations.

If Sukarno refers again to speeches made by Luns which seem to cut across reply which Luns authorized us to present to Indonesians, you should point out that Luns has a political problem, that public speeches both in Netherlands and in Indonesia are not always consistent with what is said privately, and that both governments are obviously skeptical of each other’s attitudes.

The net result of my talks with Luns and the exchanges we have had with both governments reveal no fundamental obstacle to the conclusion of a successful agreement within the framework of the Bunker proposals.

You should add that we are under no illusion that total solution can be reached in matter couple of days. Negotiations will doubtless be protracted and difficult requiring patience and goodwill. However, if GOI prepared accept our estimate this matter, there is no further obstacle talks being resumed and we would appreciate knowing date when Indos could meet again with Dutch.

Ambassador can inform Sukarno that if Indos are prepared make public announcement willingness resume talks on basis Bunker proposals we would welcome such statement publicly. In our view if talks resumed pressure Dutch public opinion would tend prevent break up.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–1662. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Tyler, Beaudry, and Rusk; cleared by Rice and McGhee; and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to The Hague and to USUN.
1. In telegram 2019 from Djakarta, May 16, Jones reported that he planned to use an invitation to have morning coffee with Sukarno to press for Indonesia to resume negotiations over West New Guinea/West Irian. Jones needed some evidence that the Netherlands was prepared to make the talks work. In telegram 2015 from Djakarta, May 15, Jones reported a discussion with Subandrio in which Subandrio was adamant that Indonesia would not resume negotiations without evidence of Netherlands willingness to negotiate in good faith. (Ibid., 656.9813/5–1562 and 656.98/5–1662)
2. This telegram did not arrive in Djakarta in time for Jones to use in the May 18 morning meeting with Sukarno, but Jones did make the points to Subandrio on May 19. In both meetings, Sukarno and Subandrio expressed great skepticism of Netherlands intentions. (Telegrams 2036 and 2040 from Djakarta, May 18 and 19; ibid., 656.9813/5–1862 and 656.9813/5–1962)