Office of the Historian

268. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)0

Washington, May 22, 1962.

Carl—

At Governor Harriman’s meeting at State this morning1 it was agreed that another appeal to the Dutch at this point would be almost” useless. As Bunker put it, with no dissenters, “Luns is playing us for suckers”; he would merely stall some more.

The consensus was that instead we should recommend public surfacing of the Bunker formula, as the most effective means of pressure on Dutch.2 Rather than leaking it, Bunker could write a letter to U Thant saying he was stymied; U Thant would publish letter (containing formula) as part of an appeal to bothsides to stop fighting and return to the table on this basis.

We would simultaneously tell Van Roijen that Indos had refused to resume talks on basis of Luns’ Athens statement; ergo, this is dead.

Letter to DeQuay would be held in reserve until after formula’s publication had had a chance to sink in, thus using President’s influence at right time.

Above tactics make sense. At this point, having tried every which way to cajole and persuade Dutch, we’re forced to conclude that nothing short of generating domestic political pressure on Luns via publication of Bunker formula will suffice. Dutch will react violently, but if our aim is to force a peaceful settlement, it’s cheap at this price.3

Bob K.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 5/62. Secret. There is an “OK” written on the source text, apparently by Kaysen.↩
  2. No other record of this meeting has been found.↩
  3. In two memoranda to Bundy, May 21, Komer suggested publicizing the Bunker formula or using friendly journalists to pressure the Dutch indirectly. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 5/62)↩

  4. McGhee and Harriman also discussed the problem by telephone in a short conversation on May 22. The transcript reads:

    • “1. If we are going back to DeQuay (which Secy accepts) he would like to consider injection of concept of military standstill.” (Could be applied only to Indonesians, you can’t stop the Dutch, they are en route.) (Harriman: you can turn ships around, it must be applied to both.)
    • “2. Explain to the Dutch why this thing worked out with Luns was not acceptable. That we tell DeQuay we did the best we could. We thought this was adequate. That the Indonesians made their own assessment. And they concluded the Dutch have no serious interest in negotiations.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations)

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