Office of the Historian

266. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0

Washington, May 17, 1962.

Attached are cables illustrating the current impasse over West New Guinea.1 In a nutshell, the Indos refuse to return to the table until they have better assurance than Luns’ grudging statement that the Dutch are really willing to accept Indonesian administration. Their impression, like ours (see cables on Rusk/Luns talks)2 is that Dutch are not yet in fact willing to buy such an idea.

Our next step turns on what our strategic objective is. If we really stand by Bunker conclusion that Indo administration is the only road to a peaceful settlement, then clearly the weight of our effort must be forcing the Dutch to face this fact.

Mac Bundy and I propose a strong message from you to DeQuay saying that before we can go back and tell the Indos that Dutch are sincere, US itself is entitled to ask this question. We feel that nothing short of this will jar Dutch loose.

[Page 592]

State on the other hand favors a double-barreled approach: (1) we should go ahead and tell the Indos that, while we can’t guarantee Dutch performances, we expect them to come through; (2) simultaneously, we should tell the Dutch we were doing so and urge them to play ball.

What is at issue is less the tactics of our next move than a basic decision on our part. Do our larger interests in Southeast Asia demand a peaceful settlement (even if this forces us to lean toward Indo side to get one), or should we preserve a more even-handed approach, based on the merits of the issue, as Secretary Rusk seems to favor? With the crisis already well along toward a collision, we must decide this now.

R.W. Komer3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 5/62. Secret. There is an indication on the source text that this is McGeorge Bundy’s copy, but no indication whether the President saw it.↩
  2. No telegrams were attached, but probably Komer is referring to those cited in footnote 1, Document 267.↩
  3. See Document 263 and footnote 1 thereto.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩