262. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Athens0
Tosec 46. Eyes only from President for Secretary Having reviewed the latest developments in the New Guinea dispute, it seems to me that your meeting with Luns on Saturday will mark a critical juncture. It has been a full month since we endorsed the Bunker formula, which the Indonesians have since approved in principle, even after the modifications made to meet Van Roijen’s objections.
Of course if Luns is coming to tell you, however ungraciously, that the Dutch will resume talks on this basis, we have no problem. I am worried, however, that Van Roijen’s last talk with you may imply a renewed effort by Luns to commit the US to supporting Dutch on several additional particulars as the price for coming to the table. I do not see how we can do so at this point, and still keep our influence with the Indonesians. Moreover, I am satisfied that the questions raised by the Dutch with respect to guarantees of Papuan rights and the nature of the UN presence are obviously subjects for negotiations but cannot be prejudged.
Therefore, if Luns is still trying to pose unreasonable conditions I hope you will take a very firm line. Our mediation is only going to succeed if the Dutch accept Bunker’s basic position and go on from there. I think we should leave Luns in no doubt on this point but tell him plainly that if our mediation is to continue, it is imperative that the Dutch return promptly to the table without further haggling on preconditions that can as well be discussed directly with Indonesians. Otherwise it is hard to see any further useful purpose to be served by Bunker’s good offices.
In your discretion, you may want to indicate that these views have my full support.
To buttress the above, I would have no objection to your saying that we only can be available to lean against unreasonable Indonesian resistance [Page 587] to safeguards after negotiations are resumed. We cannot make any flat commitments on our views but we can assure Luns that Bunker’s general view is also ours. You can also say that you and I well realize that the US will be blamed for those aspects of a compromise settlement which will inevitably be unsatisfactory in some degree to both sides (indeed we have deliberately let ourselves be put in this exposed position to give both sides someone else to blame). But I do not know how much longer the US should continue to expose itself to pressures and recriminations if its efforts are unlikely to be successful.
Finally, you might point out that Bunker would naturally have to explain publicly why he was withdrawing (i.e. because he could not bring the two parties together) and to indicate the nature of his proposals. FYI, instead of actually withdrawing Bunker at this time, it might be preferable simply to publish appropriate details of his mediatory effort as a means of pressure on the Dutch. End FYI.
I realize that this line of action would smack of an ultimatum to Luns, and might evoke another violent reaction. But it took just such pressure to get the Dutch to consider Indonesian administration in the first place. Subandrio’s trip to Moscow is an ominous sign that the Indonesians might not wait much longer to heat matters up again. If talks do not begin shortly, I think we will find it very hard to prevent a spiral of deterioration. Indeed, you should warn Luns that, if it comes to a military confrontation, Dutch can hardly expect us to support them after they have in effect rejected our effort to provide them with an honorable way out.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–262. Secret; Priority. Rusk was in Athens for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting May 4–6. Although the source text lists McGeorge Bundy as the drafter, the telegram was drafted by Komer, On May 2, Komer sent a copy to President under cover of a memorandum stating that Robert Kennedy, Harriman, Bunker, and Tyler concurred with the draft. Komer noted that the “Dutch had stalled on the Bunker formula for a month, and Subandrio’s trip to Moscow is an ominous sign that Sukarno may be giving up hope.” Komer told the President that the best way to “lean on” the Dutch was to threaten to withdraw Bunker and to publish the details of his efforts, which Luns had carefully kept from the Dutch public and Parliament. Such a move would cause a “ruckus” and might lead to Luns’ fall, so he would be anxious to forestall it. Without Presidential instructions, Rusk would not put such pressure on Luns. Komer’s draft was identical to this telegram. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 5/62)↩