Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

263. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Athens, May 6, 1962, 9 p.m.

Secto 78. Eyes only President and Acting Secretary. Separate telegram contains results two conversations with Luns about West New Guinea.¹ We are on very thin margins with Luns on this matter but I believe it is worth pursuing in attempt to get discussions going again.

There is no question but that further conversations will be extremely difficult, at least in the beginning, and that we would have to press Indonesians to go long way in “adequate guarantees for Papuan interests” in exchange for Dutch acceptance of transfer administration. Although Luns spoke of possible termination of matter in face of force majeure by Indonesians, I have clearly the impression that what he really meant was that responsibility for a settlement disagreeable to Dutch would be placed solidly upon force majeure in the form of irresistible pressure from the U.S.

Luns invited us to be “a Greek and a half in coaxing the Indonesians into a further round of talk. Nevertheless, he did offer a formulation which seemed to me to be workable for purposes convening talks unless Indonesians insist upon gold-plated commitments before talks even begin. There is no question, however, but that resumed talks would be extremely difficult and could be thrown off by injudicious public statements in The Hague or Djakarta.

At no point has Luns or Van Roijen raised subjects for discussion that could not be encompassed within framework present draft Bunker formulation. Hence I believe we can honestly say to Indonesians that they should now resume talks in order to find out whether agreement cannot now be reached within Bunker formula. My guess is that considerations of prestige and political maneuver make it difficult for Dutch to say quite simply “accept Bunker proposals as basis for discussion”, but Luns said that he and I knew that in fact this is what would be discussed and he was unable or unwilling to mention any points which were clearly irrelevant.

Luns arrived Athens high state of tension but personal attitude toward me and colleagues improved considerably. He responded warmly when I told him that we deeply regretted that wretched WNG affair existed as a painful exception to otherwise close and friendly relationship.

If you believe Luns reply as given separate telegram² cannot be put to Indonesians, it seems to me that there are three main alternatives:

(A) President to go back to The Hague through PM;

(B) Accept further delay to see whether military build-up both sides would open up further opportunities explore peaceful settlement;

(C) Get another third party.

For obvious reasons I prefer to try Luns reply on Indonesians before going to The Hague, would be considerable danger in delay during military build-up and see no likelihood that another third party could move situation toward solution of problem, consequences of which we ourselves cannot avoid. On last point, for example, Luns told me that had Bunker proposals been presented to them by anyone else such as Schroeder or even his good friend Lord Home, his reply would have been “let’s go look at the tulips.”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–662. Secret; Niact.
1. Secto 79, May 6. There is also a single memorandum of conversation of these May 5–6 meetings. (Both ibid., 656.9813/5–662 and 656.9813/5–562)
2. Luns handed Rusk a statement that reads as follows: “The Netherlands Government have informed the United States Government that the Netherlands are prepared fully to discuss with Indonesia all the aspects of the so-called Bunker plan, it being understood that both parties will be free to bring up on the agenda all items for discussion they deem relevant.” The statement originally used the term “additional items,” but Rusk convinced Luns to delete it. Luns asked Rusk to transmit this statement to Indonesia. (Secto 90, May 7; ibid., 656.9813/5–762)