Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

261. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, April 27, 1962.

McGB:

After noting the pallid diplomatese of Rusk’s talk with Van Roijen and his letter to Luns,¹ and now hearing that Luns wants to discuss WNG with Rusk in Athens May 5, I conclude Dutch are stalling. There are two possible explanations: (1) the Dutch, having met us on basic point, first want to get us committed to back them on as many face-saving gestures as possible in direction of protecting Papuan rights; (2) they want to spin out the agenda formulation phase in the hope that Sukarno will do something silly to take them off the hook. While Van Roijen seemed most reasonable in his talk with you, we’re agreed that he’s several laps ahead of his government.

In any event it is almost a month since we fired off 2 April JFK letter to DeQuay (With Bunker formula).²DeQuay replied on the 14th with what most of us took to be a conditional acceptance of the basic principle of Indo administration.³ Since then, however, the Dutch emphasis has been on the conditional rather than the acceptance. First we accepted Van Roijen’s “personal” amendment to Para. 4 of Bunker formula in order to spell out a little more “adequate guarantees, including self-determination.” Next Van Roijen has come in (doubtless on instructions) asking for additional assurances about Papuan “economic, social, educational and political development.” Now Luns will probably try to talk Rusk into some such commitments.

Our problem is how to get things moving again. We have to get the Dutch to the conference table before Sukarno goes off the reservation. He’s now given Dutch practically a month, mostly on the strength of our implied assurances that Dutch were coming around.

But I doubt that State’s current soft-sell is going to succeed. Bear in mind that the only way we got Dutch to “concede” on Indo administration in the first place was through a very tough letter from the President himself, which got Dutch mad as hops but forced them to face up to the fact that we weren’t with them. To allow the Dutch to stall us further now will be to lose the forward movement which JFK démarche produced.

Therefore, if we don’t hear from Luns by this weekend, President might write DeQuay along following line (in reply to DeQuay’s letter of 14 April):

(1) President was gratified to hear from DeQuay along such statesmanlike lines. Painful as we know it was to our Dutch allies, their reply seemed to us to accept the principle of Indonesian administration provided there were adequate guarantees of Papuan right to self-determination.

(2) However, we are discouraged by the long delays in even getting negotiations begun. It has now been a month since Bunker formula was presented and parties are still not back at the table. Meanwhile, the war of words goes on, military preparations have mounted on both sides, actual fighting has begun although still on a small scale, and the risks of a military confrontation have appreciably increased.

(3) Therefore, we believe it imperative that formal negotiations begin promptly on the basis of the Bunker formula. We have tried out the Indos on amending this formula on the basis suggested by Van Roijen and they have agreed. We urge Dutch to come to the table so that we can take the road of negotiation rather than the road to war, which we understand Soviets still urging on Sukarno.

(4) We recognize that Dutch have many unanswered questions as to the nature of the guarantees of Papuan rights and the type of UN presence desirable to assure these. We regard all of these points as suitable for discussion in the negotiations, but believe that if Dutch attempt to make them conditions precedent we will be unable to get Indos to the table.

(5) Moreover, time is not on our side. We fear that if the period of indecision is spun out much longer we and the Dutch will lose the opportunities created by their statesmanlike approach to the Bunker formula to achieve a successful compromise settlement on the WNG issue. Even if one is eventually achieved, the longer it takes the less it will contribute to the strengthening of Western influence in Indo, particularly through restoration of cordial Dutch-Indo relations. The more this issue continues to poison relations between the two countries, the harder it will be for the Dutch to exact such concessions in return for conceding the principle of Indo administration.

(6) The US did not lightly undertake to offer its informal good offices under the UN umbrella and realizes that it will bear the onus for any aspects of a settlement which are unsatisfactory to elements on either side. But President wonders whether US should continue to expose itself to pressures and recriminations from both sides if its efforts are unlikely to be successful. Therefore, unless negotiations seem likely to get underway shortly, the President believes that it might be better if the US withdrew Bunker from the unenviable middle position in which he finds himself.

I have no doubt that Dutch would again react violently to such strong medicine, even when toned down. Nonetheless, the odds are in favor of the Dutch, having already conceded the basic principle, again grudgingly backing down. If not, all it will have cost is some further Dutch irritation. We need not carry out our threat to withdraw US good offices. Moreover, we would once again register with the Dutch where we really stand.⁴

I further suggest that the President get Macmillan’s views and urge him to put parallel pressure on our hardheaded allies.

Bob K.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 4/62. Secret.
1. Regarding the conversation with van Roijen on April 24, see footnote 1, Document 260. On April 25, the Department sent Luns a letter in Rusk’s name, which the Secretary approved. In it, Rusk noted that he considered the revised Bunker formula constituted a “working paper providing a suitable framework for the resumption of preliminary talks which in turn could lead to a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution.” Rusk noted that neither side was committed to any course of action until the final agreement was reached and that the United States would support “an arrangement for the expression of self-determination by the Papuan people which would be a reality and not a mockery.” (Telegram 943 to The Hague, April 25; Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/4–2562)
2. See footnote 4, Document 252.
3. See footnote 1, Document 258.

4. In an April 28 memorandum to Bundy, Komer again argued for sending a Presidential letter to de Quay, but he suspected the Department of State would oppose it. Komer stated:

   “In any event, Rusk/Luns meeting will be critical. Left to his own devices Rusk may not take a strong enough stand (if past experience on this issue is any guide). I believe President should stiffen his spine beforehand by instructing him to tell Dutch to fish or cut bait. Our line should be that if they won’t buy amended Bunker formula even as basis of negotiation, we see no further utility in Bunker gambit. We would further propose to make public Bunker formula on occasion of our withdrawing his good offices.

   “As we knew when we got into this exercise in the first place, US has to shoulder the burden of forcing the Dutch to a reasonable solution. Having gone this far already can we afford not to take the next painful step?” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 4/62)