Office of the Historian

204. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy0

Washington, March 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Korea

You may have read the paper written by Hugh Farley, the ICA officer until recently in charge of the Technical Assistance Program in Korea. He returned to try to communicate to the town a sense of the dangers and instability in the Korean situation and especially to urge the Government to act before the April 19 anniversary of the Seoul student demonstrations.

The Department of State has reviewed his paper and received an evaluation from the Ambassador in Seoul (1142, March 11, 1961).1 Both the Department of State and the Ambassador, while recognizing the dangers in the present situation, believe it more likely than Farley does, that we can get through the Spring without a Korean explosion. The underlying fact is that all hands agree the situation in Korea is not good; and American policy in Korea requires a fresh look. Mac Bundy and I have indicated, through Mr. Battle, that the White House would like the State Department to come up with an indication of what it proposes to do in both the short run and the longer run in Korea.2

Fundamentally, the problem is to get our massive aid to Korea shifted around in a way which would not merely keep Korea from going down for the third time, but would begin to get Korea moving forward. There are in Korean politics, in the post-Rhee situation, elements who might join us in such a forward effort; but, equally, these elements could turn against us. We wish you to be informed of this situation. You may wish to discuss it directly with Mr. Rusk.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Affairs, Countries Series, Korea, General, 1/61-3/61. Confidential. Rostow had asked Robert Johnson of the NSC Staff for advice on Korea in light of Farley’s report. Johnson responded in a March 15 memorandum to Rostow supporting Farley’s proposals. Johnson wondered if Farley’s “procedural device of sending a special emissary” was as important as it was for the United States to identify itself dramatically with reform and progress in Korea. If the President agreed, Johnson recommended that the Department of State be asked to make recommendations on how to approach the ROK on reform. (Ibid.)↩
  2. See footnote 1, Document 203.↩
  3. Rostow called Executive Secretary Lucius Battle on March 15 and told him that the President had seen Farley’s report. Rostow asked that the Department prepare recommendations on Korea as soon as possible. (Note by Battle, March 15; Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/3-1561)↩