Office of the Historian

203. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0

Washington, March 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Action in Korea

Agree completely that gut issue is not whether violence likely on 19 April1 (Farley merely made himself vulnerable to State riposte by hinging too much on this).2 The real issue is whether Korean picture, with which we have failed to come to grips for eight years, is really serious enough to warrant urgent action.3

Look at the basic problems of the ROK: (a) a poor country with few resources and skills; (b) saddled with staggering task of supporting a far larger military establishment than it really able to (or than is needed); (c) corruption feeding on inexperience in democratic government; and (d) a rising nationalism and expectancy frustrated by what the ROKs increasingly believe is US disinclination to accord them full equality, push for unification, or change overwhelming military emphasis in ROK.

Underlying ills and needs are economic. Major thrust of US effort over next decade must be:

a.
Substantial cutback in ROK military establishment, with diversion of US funds thus released to crash economic development. Defense of ROK could be met by ROK plus US forces in Korea and reminders to Bloc of US intent instantly to protect from outside Korea.
b.
Buildup of ROK economy, stressing public sector, creation of light labor-intensive industry, and full utilization of main ROK resource—people.
c.
Much more vigorous, imaginative US action in directing and supervising ROK economic development. In addition to basic long-term projects, the undertaking as well of a number of high-impact, short-term projects for political effect. Closer and more active instruction and supervision of ROK government, in such projects, but also more attribution to ROK government of their benefits.
d.
Insistence on much more vigorous ROK crackdown on corruption, smuggling, illegal profiteering wherever found; similar US action against US nationals guilty of these; strong steps towards a more spartan US standard of life in ROK to avoid present embarrassing disparity.

Political actions also imperative:

a.
Move forcefully to get a satisfactory status of forces agreement. By so doing we can buy public acceptance that our greater involvement in ROK economic direction will require.
b.
Get ROK to take offensive on unification issue, with ROK public a major target. Unification is an abiding yearning of the Korean people, founded in both nationalistic and economic impulses. The US must pre-sent itself at the forefront of those favoring unification, making sure in the process that terms protect ROK and Free World interests.
c.
Sharply reduce political role in ROK of US military and its spokesmen; make US Ambassador undisputed spokesman of US policy in Korea; greatly expand educational and labor contacts, leader grants, etc., between US and ROK.4

Bob K.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 1/61-3/61. Secret. In a March 9 memorandum to Rostow, Komer suggested that the Kennedy administration not confine itself “to the political-economic aspects Hugh Farley dusts off so nicely, but hit the military angle too. For too many years a disportionate share of MAP dollars has been going to maintain huge ROK forces far beyond the likely need.” (Ibid.)↩
  2. In telegram 1142 from Seoul, March 11, the Embassy presented a long analysis to support its conclusion that the “popular mood in Korea seems to be one of disenchantment rather than angry protest.” The Embassy continued, “despite significant elements of instability in internal situation, they are not of a volume or character which would lead to general, spontaneous disturbances such as occurred in March-April 1960.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/3-1161)↩
  3. William Sheppard of ICA agreed that Farley was too anxious over the April 19 date. He did not agree with Farley’s proposed crash program or the reorganization of USOM. (Memorandum from Sheppard to Labouisse, March 10; ibid., 811.0095B/3-861)↩
  4. In a March 5 memorandum to Bacon, Deputy Assistant Secretary Avery Peterson, commenting on Farley’s report, observed that “there are fundamental elements of truth in Mr. Farley’s assessment but as a general statement [it is]too seriously overdrawn and emotional rather than rational.” Bacon sent Steeves a memorandum on March 10 briefing him on Farley’s report. (Ibid., 811.0085B/3-561 and 811.0095B/3-1061)↩
  5. Komer attached a CIA memorandum prepared for the DCI and asked Rostow to “use w. discretion.” It was an advance copy of Document 206.↩