205. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0

SUBJECT

  • Appraisal of Farley on Korea

Enclosed you will find memoranda relating to the analysis and recommendations made by Mr. Hugh Farley about Korea.1 The Department concurs in the general conclusion reached by the Special Committee that Mr. Labouisse established to inquire into Mr. Farley’s proposal. You will note that the conclusion might be summarized as follows: we do not disagree with the broad outlines of the problem as set forth by Mr. Farley; we do not feel that the courses of action proposed are likely to achieve the results that he desires—and which the Department desires as well.

I am proposing that a further step be taken, however—one which was discussed with you the other night at dinner.

A special mission should be sent to Korea headed by Max Millikan, a mission patterned on the Presidential Special Mission that is now in Bolivia. The purposes of the special mission to Korea would be these:

(a)
Drawing on the useful report of the Inspector General and Comptroller of January 1961 as a point of departure (the conclusions of this report preceded but coincide fairly closely with the analysis in Mr. Farley’s memorandum), the mission should endeavor to translate the report’s conclusions into action at the earliest possible date. It should also consider carefully the type of organization needed and the numbers and quality of personnel required to carry out an effective aid program.
(b)
Using as a point of departure the new aid concepts now decided upon by the President, the special mission should attempt a revamping of the economic effort in Korea consistent with these proposals.
(c)
The two elements of reform and new program that would be the principal purposes of the special mission would contribute to a third [Page 430] highly desirable result, namely the building of a body of evidence which would be of great value in the course of presenting the new aid program to Congress. It would be a concrete case study in the application of new development principles.

Mr. Labouisse will take responsibility for moving this project along in my absence. I hope that it will be possible to call on the President to induce Dr. Millikan to accept this assignment.

George W. Ball2
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5-MSP/3-2061. No classification marking. Drafted by J. Robert Schaetzel of Ball’s office.
  2. Enclosed was a March 16 memorandum from the Special Executive Committee (Sheppard of ICA, Steeves of the Department of State, and James Cooley of ICA) to Labouisse. This committee concluded that the problems described by Farley were “serious,” but were well-known in Seoul and Washington. The report continued that “Mr. Farley’s diagnosis of Korea’s ills is too largely centered on the issues of corruption and that the remedies he prescribes are in a major degree too sweeping and too likely to be counter-productive.” It concluded: “In short, we cannot agree with the extent, the nature, and the timing of the measures proposed by Mr. Farley to cope with the problem.” Also attached, but not printed, was a report on Korea by the Assistant Deputy Director and Controller for Mutual Security, Edward F. Tennant, who spent several weeks in Korea in January 1961.
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.