299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
4053. Secretary used long talk with T.T. Krishnamachari and M.J. Desai May 17 to sound Indians out on air defense arrangement. Recalled India had been reluctant to use combat air arm when Chicoms attacked last fall because of concern over possible Chicom retaliation on Indian cities. Question now was what to do in future. First task is to get existing Indian Air Force into best possible operational condition. British are working on this. Then there is problem of radar. We have been examining coverage of Delhi and Calcutta areas and believe we can arrange for mobile radars for this task pending installation permanent radar, for which lead time is up to 18 months. There is also communications and training requirement. We are prepared to start right away on training.
Secretary then said there was one possibility, which had major international and internal political implications, which he wanted to mention quite tentatively: whether US and Commonwealth squadrons [Page 600] should take part in the defense of Indian cities. Said we did not have Commonwealth agreement and had not come to final conclusion but believed this important way in which we could reinforce India’s military. Noted that fly through of squadrons for training would give signal to Chicoms and have deterrent effect. Also noted this arrangement might give Indians political problems.
At first TTK replied only briefly and then turned to another subject. Said Indians had made “suggestion” of air defense arrangement when Chicoms attacked. They had thought visits of Western squadrons might be camouflaged as joint US-UK-India training exercises. TTK then moved on to argue India’s case for three squadrons supersonics.
Subject came up briefly again when TTK mentioned his consultation re air defense with Australians in same manner as he had previous day. Secretary inquired whether there was possibility that Australian squadrons might come to India in event of attack. TTK replied that Indians might discuss this; proximity of Australia to India would be advantage.
Secretary returned to subject at close of conversation. Said we are now thinking about possibility of external air squadrons assisting India in event attack. Asked if this would give India political problems.
TTK replied it would be better if arrangement camouflaged so that squadrons visiting in peacetime would appear be on joint training exercises. If attack actually came, people would welcome arrangement. M.J. Desai inquired if we would provide communications equipment before arrival of squadrons on exercises. Secretary replied that we would have to start with radar and related communications equipment. We can begin this now. Question is whether we go on with squadrons.
M.J. Desai said he had raised this question with Nehru. M.J. had told him that before visit of squadrons, communications equipment would be in position. M.J. considered that with this physical evidence of assistance to India’s effort to defend itself, there would be no objection to arrangement. Said it would be better if it understood that during interval between Chicom attack and arrival external squadrons India must rely on own resources for air defense. For this purpose India needed assistance in building its own air force (three supersonic squadrons). If it were known that arrangement was cooperative plan designed at least in part to build India’s capacity defend itself, then there would be no political problem. If, however, external squadrons merely assumed India’s air defense burdens, then would be problems.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-4 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London and Karachi.↩