Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Karachi, May 17, 1963, Midnight.

2290. 1. As arranged with Bhutto before his departure for New Delhi, I met with him late today to receive GOP reply on mediation proposal.¹ Jackson and Sneider accompanied me. (James had previous important engagement in Rawalpindi and will see Bhutto separately tomorrow morning.) I found Bhutto very relaxed and friendly. Discussion, which lasted one hour, was most businesslike.

2. Bhutto informed me that GOP is prepared to accept mediation with certain safeguards. He said GOP recognizes utility of mediation in context of its basic desire for peaceful Kashmir settlement, providing safeguards can be worked out.

3. Bhutto explained desire for safeguards flowed from difficult position faced by GOP. Past experience in Kashmir negotiations with India has led Pakistan to distrust Indian tactics of obstinacy and delay. While Indians during recent negotiations remained unshaken and obstinate, Paks have made concessions. GOP fear there is risk mediator, sensing contrast in Pak and Indian attitudes, will try to get Pakistan to go further and further in making concessions while Indians sit tight. Second and basic problem concerning GOP is that Indians will spin out negotiations and, under cover of mediation and seemingly conciliatory stance it would convey, achieve their objectives of getting long-term military aid from West without having to come to any Kashmir compromise. GOP needs some assurance against such stalling tactics. Without such assurance, Pakistani public would feel GOP naive to accept mediation proposal which would give Indians this opportunity. In effect, GOP faces real problem of justifying to public entering immediately into new effort settle Kashmir question in view unproductive bilateral talks.

4. Bhutto then spelled out four safeguards sought by GOP as follows:

A) Time limit for mediation process;

B) “Freeze” on long-term military aid to India during mediation;

C) Terms of reference which would focus mediation solely on Kashmir;

D) Mediation to be in general context UNCIP resolutions.

5. Bhutto, partly in response questions on my part, spelled out these safeguards in following terms:

A) Time Limit—Desire for time limit flowed from need prevent indefinite spinning out of inconclusive negotiation by Indians. Bhutto said he had in mind something like 3 to 6 months. He thought six months should be enough for mediator, who would be man of stature and strong personality, to familiarize himself with details and work out proposals for solution. He recognized, however, danger of being completely rigid and that absolute time limit would be construed by Indians as ultimatum. While Paks were open to suggestions on specifics, they wished some formula which would convey to Pakistani public that time limit reasonably brief.

B) Arms Freeze—Bhutto said Pak position on this question not yet final. President Ayub’s own view is that mediator should have authority to say how much and what type aid India would qualify for on basis of progress toward settlement. In effect he would thus be both arbitrator on arms aid and mediator on Kashmir. Bhutto said that he is trying to dissuade Ayub from pressing this idea, pointing out decisions on arms aid are reserved to governments and cannot be delegated to mediator. I noted such decision on aid bound to be outside scope of any mediator. Bhutto said he hoped to induce Ayub not to press this point but still needed to work on him.

Bhutto’s own view on general relationship between arms aid decisions and mediation process not completely clear. He seemed to have in mind not specific threat to Indians to withhold arms aid but relating administrative and congressional decisions on specifics of arms aid to progress on Kashmir settlement without any publicized specific linkage. He felt something along these lines would also be needed satisfy Pak public opinion. He suggested for example possibility of one or two prominent senators making statements differentiating aid which would be given merely as extension of Nassau Agreement from aid of a different magnitude which might be given if mediation successful. He also recognized that our hands could not be tied in the event Chinese Communists renewed attacks on India. He said “freeze” would specifically relate to new decisions and not to pipeline deliveries or, by inference, limited extension of Nassau commitment. He also did not argue with my point that we could not agree to direct and public linkage of arms aid to Kashmir settlement though these are questions which by nature of prevailing situation, must be considered together. After extended discussion this point I had feeling that GOP, or at least Bhutto, capable of considerable flexibility on details this point.

C) Terms of Reference—Bhutto particularly wanted to avoid broad terms of reference which would permit mediator to go into side issues in Indo-Pak relations. He thought language such as “Kashmir and other related matters” would probably be adequate.

D) UNCIP Resolutions—Inasmuch as India had never formally repudiated her agreement to these resolutions, Bhutto thought that it only proper that there be some reference to them in relation to mediation effort. I had impression however he very flexible on this question. Reference might be in preamble. It clear that Bhutto did not want reference to exclude mediator in practice from working also on basis proposals made during ministerial talks.

6. In response to direct question by me, Bhutto affirmed that on specifics these points GOP is flexible and that there is considerable room for maneuver and further discussion; his basic requirement is formula which would give GOP footing to justify to public that mediation offers reasonable prospect for Kashmir settlement. In this connection, he mentioned plan to brief editors that mediation should not be turned down outright and has value to Pak interests if there safeguards. He also plans spell out beneficial aspects of ministerial talks. He plans give me before his departure for Tehran May 22 written formulation of above safeguards.² This desired by GOP for purposes of clarity. However, he assured me that reducing these points to writing should not be interpreted as an attempt to freeze them and GOP wishes to work with us to arrive agreed procedure for mediation.

7. I pointed out to Bhutto inclusion of safeguards sought by GOP posed real problems with GOI. He said he recognized this but had impression in Delhi Indians very keen on mediation and were quite disturbed over breakoff of ministerial talks.³

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Emergency; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State on May 17 at 3:49 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi and London. Relayed to the White House.
1. Bhutto had just returned from the sixth round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir, which took place in New Delhi May 14-16. At the conclusion of this final round of the talks, Bhutto and Singh issued a joint communique in which they recorded “with regret” that no agreement could be reached on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. (Telegram 4458 from New Delhi, May 16; ibid.)
2. On May 21 Bhutto delivered to McConaughy an aide-mémoire that constituted the formal Pakistani response to the mediation proposal presented to Ayub by McConaughy and James on May 5. The aide-mémoire was drafted along the lines outlined by Bhutto on May 17. A time limit of 3 months for the mediation effort was stipulated, and Pakistan took the position that it was necessary to link mediation “effectively, if not formally” to the flow of Western arms supplies to India. (Telegram 2321 from Karachi, May 21; ibid.)
3. Komer sent a copy of telegram 2290 to President Kennedy on May 18, under cover of a memorandum in which he offered his assessment of the Pakistani response to the mediation proposal: “The Paks clearly see little hope in mediation, but would like to use it to forestall further US/UK aid to India.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 5/63)