Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India⁰

Washington, February 16, 1963, 8:13 p.m.

3181. Here are our thoughts regarding tactics for fourth round Kashmir talks in Calcutta. These are based on study your excellent analyses as well as impressions brought back by Talbot and Jackson.¹ You should comment urgently so we have time to coordinate with British and get our lines straight long enough before next round to enable us step up our input.

We view talks as having progressed logically, if somewhat slowly. Indians and Paks sloughed off traditional positions at first round, agreed on certain principles in second, got down to maps in third. We agree with Karachi, however, that parties have yet to come to grips with hard realities. Indians have failed so far to signal disposition to divide Vale, and Paks have reserved position on tough choice between an internationalization formula which Indians probably would reject and territorial division plan which would be politically risky for them.

Looking toward round at Calcutta we see two problems. First relates to bargaining positions both sides. Indian proposal at Karachi was step forward which seemed invite Paks into market place. Paks responded with such an inadequate offer that we might have expected Indians to turn it down out of hand. Instead it has probably been left over for final disposition at Calcutta where Indians seem likely start off by complete rejection Pak line. Problem then will be how to get talks moving again. We believe burden will and should be on Paks to restore movement by making a business offer.

This gets us to second problem. We are perplexed by timing Calcutta talks. Pressures on negotiators which may be generated in Lok Sabha and National Assembly seem likely increase difficulties of compromise already evident in press reactions from both sides, particularly in Pakistan. Task therefore is to avoid impasse stimulated by political pressures and produce achievement adequate to justify continuation talks.

It is our judgment that Paks are unlikely to give serious consideration to proposal for partition of Vale until they have introduced their idea of internationalization and had it discussed seriously. If this analysis correct, we see advantage Pak internationalization idea coming in promptly in fourth round. This would have double advantage getting this proposal aired and letting Paks face and cope with Indian objections and its introduction might ease Pak public opinion problem. It will not be enough, however, for Paks to talk of vague idea of internationalization. They must get down to specific, carefully thought out formula if it is to serve as basis for useful discussion.

If our judgment of Pak intentions is correct, we will have to prepare Indians to give fair hearing to internationalization proposal. Providing such proposal includes realistic lines north and south of Vale, discussion of it might serve purpose keeping bargaining going during difficult period when legislatures in session. To counter Pak internationalization proposal, we would hope Indians might come up with refined proposal for territorial division giving Paks substantial position in Vale and incorporating functional arrangements which, as Delhi points out, would divide Vale without denying it to people on either side. We recognize, however, that they may have other ideas about counter proposal at this stage. Such an exchange would give us opportunity throw in more detailed ideas before and during fourth round on functional arrangements. Also it could lay foundations for circumstances in which ultimately we might, if necessary, make proposal cloaked as combination territorial division and internationalization.

Obviously scenario like this calls for increased US/UK input and prodding. Our ideas on tactics for Karachi:

1) We should inform Paks we look for further progress in bilateral talks. We will have suggestions for both sides to consider in these talks and intend to step up our substantive discussions with both. Best course for Paks is to tone down expectations and start looking to fifth round when better groundwork laid for more productive bargaining. Moreover legislatures may not be in session.

2) Make it entirely clear we believe Paks must make first substantial move in next round. We believe that settlement can be achieved only through agreeing upon international boundary running through Kashmir. But if, as we expect, Paks insist they can’t go beyond Shahi’s “fall back” position, we should emphasize that they must make some negotiable proposal. Although we believe internationalization is not route towards solution, it would be better for Paks to table it than drawing another unsatisfactory line, provided proposal includes realistic borders to north and south.

3) GOP obviously making little effort to prepare Pakistan people for an unpopular solution. We feel there two steps Embassy might take to help this necessary educational process along.

a) We should indicate our deep concern to GOP at lack of effort in this connection. We realize GOP does not exercise tight control over press, but it does lay down guidelines. These guidelines should at minimum point out that interests of India as well as Pakistan must be taken fully into account if workable settlement is to be reached. We are aware of anti-American bias in Information Ministry and believe any approaches on press policy should be made to Bhutto or at minimum at DG level in MEA.

b) Country Team should work out complementary and coordinated approaches pitched at various significant segments of Pakistan society. These approaches should stress that chances for a workable Kashmir settlement are better now than they have ever been, but that if this opportunity is missed, chances are exceedingly dim that status quo ever will be changed. Both India and Pakistan must sacrifice long held positions, but this painful process is a prerequisite for a solution. Military and security aspects of this should be stressed in conversations with Pak military; economic benefits with business community and labor; and whole range of benefits accruing to Pakistan with GOP officials and MNA’s including opposition politicians.

In India we propose following:

1) We should make clear to GOI that while Indian proposal was step forward it fell far short of what Indians knew in advance we thought was necessary, i.e., substantial Pak position in Vale. Indians should know that they must be prepared to concede considerably more than symbolic Pak presence in Vale if settlement is to be reached.

2) We should explain to Indians in same manner as to Paks reasons why we believe expectations of Calcutta round should not be exaggerated. Indians should demonstrate understanding of political pressures under which Pakistan delegation will be operating.

3) We should alert Indians to be prepared for likelihood Paks may propose internationalization plan. We should tell Indians that we assume they will give this fair hearing. If they do not believe they can accept such a proposal, they should be prepared to submit a more attractive plan for territorial division.

4) We should suggest to Indians that one way of making such a plan for division more palatable to Pakistan would be by incorporating in it certain functional arrangements designed to minimize inconvenience of division of Vale. FYI: We will be sending our suggestions soon which we expect on basis preliminary studies should be of interest to both parties. End FYI. Obviously such features would be meaningless, however, if Pakistan were not given a substantial position in Vale.

5) We believe circumstances require new campaign in depth to convince Indians of influence in political, military, civil service and business fields of reasons why it in India’s interest to make concessions necessary for Kashmir settlement. Emphasis this campaign should probably be on need for substantial Pak presence in Vale since we believe it is here Nehru may balk. We do believe events have indicated Nehru is responsive to political groundswells beneath him. Our efforts to influence those who can influence Nehru might tip balance in achieving settlement. This we believe is worth risk we realize is involved. Our efforts should emphasize importance of Kashmir settlement to India’s defenses against Chicoms. Particular emphasis should be given to inescapable relationship between longer run military aid to India and Indian contributions toward settlement Kashmir dispute. We should also stress that general Congressional attitude toward India will be greatly affected by Indian efforts to improve relations with Pakistan.

We again stress that efforts should be made to prepare public on both sides for compromise settlement (Deptel 3153 to New Delhi,² 1235 Karachi, repeated info 4321 London). Also desirable urge each side to try to look at negotiations and formulae for settlement from standpoint of selling job which other must do at home. This particularly pertinent during next round which will take place under wary eyes two legislatures.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider, Cameron, and Gatch; cleared with BNA and FE; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.
1. Elmore Jackson, Special Assistant for U.N. Planning in IO and an expert on the Kashmir issue.
2. Dated February 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)