194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan0
754. Ambassador Aziz Ahmed presented Ayub’s letter (septel)1 to President this evening. President confined reply to statement he would be in touch again with Ayub. Ambassador then offered chart titled “Disposition of Indian Forces”2 showing three divisions in Kashmir, three divisions and one infantry brigade on West Pakistan border, and one division and two brigades on East Pakistan border, as contrasted to one division and one brigade in Ladakh and three divisions in NEFA area. Navy shown as concentrated in Bombay, except two small ships.
President suggested that while still uncertain whether Chinese intentions limited or to dominate area, India taking situation seriously, perhaps more so than President Ayub. Ambassador agreed that even if Chinese take only territory in dispute, it serious for India. Said Pakistan believes China wants to take disputed area, face India with a fait accompli, and then negotiate end of hostilities. Fact that Soviet supplying MIGs indicates Communists don’t expect big war in prospect. However, perhaps next spring situation will be clearer.
President said he recognized Pakistan Government’s interest in settling Kashmir dispute, asked what Pakistan thinks best course to achieve this. Ambassador answered that Pakistan understands that in India official circles building up a trend of feeling toward rapprochement with Pakistan. Pakistan believes this should be encouraged. Any gesture by Pakistan, e.g. to pull troops back from Kashmir border, would halt this favorable trend. He repeated familiar arguments that whole region will stay insecure, unstable and economically retarded so long as the Kashmir dispute remains unsettled. Pakistani people very much exercised over military assistance to India, he said, because, basing idea of what India might do in future on what it has done in past, Pakistan persuaded that any large scale assistance to India would only strengthen India against Pakistan and India would use this equipment at first opportunity against Pakistan. All political leaders have opposed the grant of military assistance to India by the US and the question of giving any Pakistani assurances to India.
[Page 377]President, replying deliberately and clearly, said question of assurances is matter for Pakistani decision, but US is interested in stopping the advance of Communism in Asia. Amount of US aid, as Ambassador knows, is minimal; if it should grow large we would discuss matter with Pakistan. It is important, President continued, that US indicate its opposition to the expansion of the Communist Chinese in Asia. We understand problem of Kashmir. Possibly out of all this will come some settlement. Can also understand Ayub’s feeling that what is happening to India is result of its own foolish policies. On other hand, US cannot stand by idly while China tries to expand its power in Asia.
Ambassador returned once more to argument that if threat is real, what is important is not giving arms but freeing the Indian Army to fight against Chinese. At present, India fighting with hands tied behind back. This not merely question of improving relations between India and Pakistan but of stopping Communists. He did not see how India can accomplish this end unless it settled Kashmir with Pakistan.
President responded merely that he would be in touch with President Ayub again.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11-1262. Secret. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Kaysen in substance, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and to London for Grant, Gaud, and Bundy.↩
- Document 195.↩
- This chart is attached to a November 12 memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Ahmed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 11/62)↩