193. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
The Pakistani are going through a genuine emotional crisis as they see their cherished ambitions of using the US as a lever against India going up in the smoke of the Chinese border war. Their plaint about lack of consultation is mere cover for this (if we’d “consulted” with the Paks, instead of notifying them, we’d still be arguing about Kashmir).
Given Pak bitterness, our pitch should be sympathetic understanding and no pressure. We can let the facts themselves work for us.
But I urge equally strongly that there be no give in our position. We have no need to apologize. If we compensate Ayub for our actions vis-a-vis India, we will again be postponing the long-needed clarification of our position, and this at a time when we’ve never had a better excuse for clarifying it.
Whether Pakistan moves from words to action depends on whether it is willing to risk its relationship with the US. Ayub probably isn’t, but he may be a prisoner of Pak public emotions in this case. Moreover, even Ayub has found that a hard line often works well with us. I am convinced, however, that in the last analysis the Paks will realize that they get far too much from their US tie to be able to do without it. So if we can weather the current shock, we should be able to hold on to our assets in Pakistan, while still emerging with the sub-continent-wide policy toward which we aim.