Mr. President:
Attached is the current situation report on the Sino-Indian border war you
requested. It was prepared by the Department of State, in consultation with
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. It represents
the agreed views of all three.
I would add one comment on section 3 of the memorandum. Section 3-b (page 5)
is devoted to difficulties that the new situation in India will raise for
our relations with Pakistan. It seems to me that the problem could be stated
a little more sharply in a somewhat different way. We are now faced with the
necessity of making the Pakistani realize that their alliance with us had
been of immense value to them. This comprises not only the substantial
economic and military assistance we have given, but also the general support
that the alliance provides in their relations with India. They are obviously
the weaker power, and they have been able to maintain as strong a line on
Kashmir as they have in part because of the existence of our support in the
background. We are now beginning to confront them with the fact that we are
really not able to support their demand for a settlement via plebiscite, and
that their best opportunity for settlement on terms something like
ratification of the status quo may be passing from their grasp. This will be
a difficult and painful process, but it is one we must push through.
Attachment2
Report on Current Activity on the Sino-Indian Borderand
Estimate of Future Developments
India is facing its most serious crisis since independence. Large-scale
Chinese Communist attacks (see map attachment)3 in the Northeast
[Page 364]
Frontier Agency (NEFA) have resulted in Chinese advances at
a number of points, some of them approximately 15 miles south of the
McMahon Line, and in Ladakh the Chinese Communists have overcome Indian
forward positions and threaten the principal Indian bases in that area.
Moreover, the Soviet Union has supported Peking’s proposals for
negotiation on terms unacceptable to the Indians. These developments
strike at the heart of India’s policy of nonalignment and have
far-reaching internal consequences. India has turned to the West for
assistance in meeting its military requirements. The development of a
closer Western relationship with India is causing an almost traumatic
reaction in Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy over the past decade has
been directed in large part towards correcting the imbalance of power
with India through the special alliance relationship with the West.
1. What is Going On: A Military and Political
Review
Military
The present phase of the Sino-Indian border conflict began early last
spring when India decided to put out advanced patrols and outposts in
the Ladakh area in an effort to forestall further Chinese advances there
and eventually to push back some of the Chinese outposts. In July the
Chinese demanded that the Indians withdraw their forward patrols and
threatened, if they did not do so, to invade NEFA. Instead of withdrawing, the Indians intensified their
forward patrolling activities in the months that followed.
There is now evidence that in August and early September the Chinese
concentrated their troops at points along the NEFA border. They launched an attack on October 20. Within
a week the Chinese Communist forces advanced at several places within
NEFA, reaching at one point near
the Bhutan border a position approximately 15 miles south of the McMahon
Line. Simultaneously, the Chinese attacked in Ladakh and eliminated the
forward posts established by the Indians last spring and summer.4
Total Indian casualties are in the neighborhood of 5,000.
Chinese gains have been a result of a combination of advantages over the
Indians, most notably a better supply situation, more modern equipment
and larger numbers of men.
At the present time, the Chinese seem to have halted their advance in
NEFA. In Ladakh the Chinese have
also halted along the boundary line which they claimed in 1960, but they
are in a position to move against important Indian positions just west
of this line.
[Page 365]
As the Chinese have moved further into Indian-claimed territory, their
supply problems have increased but even so they still appear to have a
limited advantage over the Indians in this respect. The present halt in
the Chinese Communist advance may be designed to permit them to regroup,
resupply and prepare for further limited advances. At a minimum the
Chinese Communists will consolidate, with some minor tactical
adjustments, and dig into their positions in preparation for the severe
winter. The indications are that they want to hold the territory which
they now occupy, at least as a bargaining counter; they show no
particular interest in a negotiated settlement; nor do they seem
interested thus far in extending their military activities beyond the
disputed border areas. Future Chinese Communist military action may well
be determined in large part by Indian moves.
Political
The rapid Chinese advances in both NEFA
and Ladakh have had a profound effect on Indian political thinking. The
Indian leaders are being forced to re-examine some of the basic
assumptions which have been central to Indian political life and
attitudes. The great exponent of peaceful coexistence has been attacked
by a nation which ostentatiously shared this attitude. The effectiveness
of nonalignment as a policy has been clearly brought into question. The
Soviet Union’s action in supporting an unacceptable Chinese Communist
offer to negotiate the conflict has led the Indians to rethink their
thesis that they could count on the Soviet Union to restrain the Chinese
Communists and to provide India with substantial quantities of military
equipment.
These developments cannot but have a far-reaching effect on the internal
Indian power structure. The demotion of Krishna Menon, who has been widely criticized, from his
position as Minister of Defense to that of Minister of Defense
Production is one of the first public manifestations of these
changes.5 The position of the Communist
Party of India has been undermined. Other important changes will follow
and increased strains will be placed on Prime Minister Nehru. We anticipate a long period ahead
of adjustment and examination.
Also of very great importance, these developments threaten to place a
heavy additional burden on an Indian economy already falling short of
its economic development goals, and at the very time when the attainment
of these goals is more important than ever.
[Page 366]
2. What We and Other Western Countries are
Doing
In face of reverses both on the border and in Indian foreign relations,
Prime Minister Nehru asked for
Western assistance. After deliberately waiting for the Prime Minister’s
request, the United States initiated an air shipment on November 1 of
military supplies to India designed to reinforce Indian resistance on
the border to the Chinese Communists. These initial shipments
include:
| 40,000 |
Anti-personnel Mines |
| 1,000,000 |
Rounds caliber .30 ammunition |
| 200 |
Caliber .30 Machine Guns with mounts and accessories |
| 54 |
81 millimeter mortars with mounts and accessories |
| 100,000 |
Rounds 81 millimeter ammunition |
| 500 |
ANPRC-10 radios |
| 250 |
ANGRC-9 radios |
India has also approached the United Kingdom, Canada, and France with
requests for various types of military equipment primarily in the field
of small arms, infantry support and anti-tank weapons, together with
necessary ammunition, communications equipment, transport aircraft, and
helicopters. India has also requested rapid delivery of equipment
previously ordered, and apparently is making direct commercial inquiries
about procuring aircraft in the United Kingdom.
Canada is currently attempting to determine availability of a wide range
of equipment which would be useful to India. The United Kingdom has
air-lifted a small amount of automatic rifles and ammunition, and is
also determining availability of other items. The French have also
air-lifted a small amount of small arms.
In addition, Turkey has offered India some light mountain artillery and
ammunition. We anticipate this equipment will be available for shipment
within the next two or three days, at which time we will airship it to
India.
We are making every effort to establish coordination procedures with
other Western governments to insure a concerted effort in our joint
attempts to meet Indian military requirements.
In addition to military supplies, the United States has undertaken the
following actions:
- a
- We have attempted to get the Pakistani to see that they have a
major opportunity to lay a basis for better relations with
India. These efforts have not yet been successful, but we
believe we should continue to search out ways to get this across
to the Pakistani.
- b
- We have publicly stated that the United States recognizes the
McMahon Line as the accepted international border sanctioned by
modern usage.
- c
- We are increasing the flow of intelligence on Communist China
to the Indians.
Statements of sympathy and support from Western countries contrast
sharply with silence from many important neutral leaders. Some neutrals
have been in touch with both sides in an endeavor to lay the basis for a
cease-fire.
3. Principal Policy Issues This Situation Raises for the United
States
- a
- We shall have to define a new relationship with India. Our
military assistance is designed to help a friend, not win an ally.
Western sympathy and support and Western military equipment will
profoundly affect Indian thinking. We can expect the Indians to
redefine their nonalignment policy, but we do not expect India to
abandon this policy. Although India has been forced to re-examine
the dimensions of its relations with the Soviet Union, we anticipate
that India will try to avoid doing anything which would further
restrict Soviet support. India needs Soviet economic aid, will want
Soviet support in the United Nations on Kashmir, and still hopes to
get a limited number of MIG-21’s.
- b
-
We shall have to devise means to protect our important special
interests in Pakistan and to keep Pakistan closely aligned with
the West, in the face of our new relationship with India.
Despite Pakistan’s very great dependence on the United States,
this may be the most difficult problem ahead. We had hoped that
Pakistan leaders might have grasped the present opportunity to
begin to lay the basis for mutually beneficial relations with
India. Instead, the Pakistani seem to be recoiling from any
reduction of tension with India. The last word is not in on this
and Ambassador McConaughy is seeing President Ayub on November 5.
All present signs, however, point to at least a temporary
widening of the breech between Pakistan and India, a Pakistani
reassessment of the value of its alliance with the United States
and increased political tensions within the country. Pakistan,
which sought an alliance with the United States chiefly to
offset India’s preponderant military strength in the
subcontinent, sees the value of this alliance much reduced in
the face of United States military assistance to India. This
situation bears the closest watch because Pakistan is, in fact,
going through a traumatic experience almost equal to that of
India.
a
- c
- We must search out Indian military objectives and decide the
extent to which we and our Western allies are prepared to support
these. This involves not only Indian policy on the border but also
the Indian attitude towards the modernization of its whole
obsolescent military establishment. In their current state of
disarray, the Indians themselves
[Page 368]
are not clear about their objectives. This,
therefore, will be a continuing problem. In this connection one of
the principal factors will be the impact of increased Indian
military expenditures on the achievement of Indian devaelopment
goals. The extent of this impact will depend in large part on how
the Indians define their military objectives, the extent of
resources diverted for this purpose, and the division of western
assistance between military and economic sectors.
- d
- We shall have to consider bolstering the border states (Nepal,
Sikkim and Bhutan) to counter Chinese Communist efforts to bring
them into the Chinese orbit. This will involve a re-examination of
the basis of our current policy towards these states which is to try
to fix firmly the major responsibility for these areas on
India.
- e
- We shall need to consider the implications of a possible Indian
withdrawal from international responsibilities as the result of a
reorientation of India’s attention inward under the impact of the
Chinese attack. Menon was
the great exponent of India’s participation in the international
force in the Congo. There are already indications that the Indians
are considering the withdrawal of their forces from the Congo. We
also shall need to be alert to opportunities for capitalizing on new
Indian attitudes in such specific areas as disarmament.
- f
- We must examine carefully the implications of these developments
for CENTO and SEATO.
The power relationships which affect the subcontinent have all been
shaken up. The old problems there and the new ones should be looked at
in this new light, in the days ahead, so that we can see both the
dangers and opportunities which are emerging. These will extend far
beyond the boundaries of the subcontinent.6
