189. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State0

1525. Eyes Only for SecState. Pass Defense Eyes Only DefSec, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The last fortnight has presented us here with an interesting problem in being abreast of and giving a measure of guidance to a great change in Indian policy. To have been ahead of the change would [Page 362] have aroused grave suspicion. To have been behind would have invited the same discredit into which some of India’s other professed friends have fallen. On the whole things have gone well. And I have great admiration for the way that Washington, the heavy distractions of the Cuban crisis notwithstanding, has provided intellectual, moral and material support and guidance. This is not the voice of the most banal believer in American perfection in these matters.

In the days ahead I see a new danger. That is that in our natural desire to help the Indians we will overwhelm them. They do not want to break quickly with their past beliefs. Words like nonalignment still have great evocative power. Phrases like military blocs, military alliances, even Pentagon still have a bad sound. In particular a large influx of American military personnel however well-intentioned could have a most damaging effect. And numbers could quickly get beyond my power to control and guide our political posture and response. You will already have seen in my cables indications of my anxiety that I be consulted on all plans to send people here and that it be clear to all who come that they are under my full organizational direction and control and that we select scrupulously for quality as opposed to numbers or conventional tables of organization. This no doubt reflects normal bureaucratic attitudes which I have acquired with remarkable celerity but it also reflects my deep concern for the complex task we face here and my hope that it can be discharged with credit to all of us. At this end we will continue to insure an environment in which the officers we request will function in a closely-knit and harmonious group that will, I trust, reflect full credit on the organization and services whence they come and which fully reflect the concerns and views of the latter. If my requests for help seem unduly modest or even if it should occasionally be evident that larger numbers might produce slightly better guidance to Indians or slightly more refined requirements you will realize I am sure that I am acting in response to overall considerations of our position here.1

Galbraith
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/11-162. Secret.
  2. In telegram 1904 to New Delhi, November 6, a joint State-Defense message, Galbraith was assured that there was no intent in Washington to send a large number of military advisers to India. JCS Chairman General Maxwell Taylor had selected Major General John Kelly to head a small observation group of 12-21 people and to advise the Embassy on matters relating to military assistance. General Kelly and his group would serve as part of the Country Team under Galbraith’s direction. (Ibid., 791.5/11-462) Galbraith concurred in the proposed arrangements in telegram 1675 from New Delhi, November 8. (Ibid., 791.5/11-862)