154. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State0
114. Embtel 104 to Department.1 In course my July 12 conversation with President Ayub, he thanked us with warmth and earnestness for our role in Security Council consideration of Kashmir issue. He asked me to convey his deep appreciation to the President. I told him that I felt SC consideration of matter was not entirely futile exercise, notwithstanding Soviet veto. Reaffirmation of UNCIP resolutions was useful and Soviet position had been exposed through misuse of veto. I said we did not perceive any useful step we could take at this time to contribute to settlement. Perhaps best course would be to stand back for a while and try to gain perspective which might point way to some new initiative. I added that any attempt toward a settlement would have to have Indian as well as Pakistani cooperation. Resort to use or threat of force was unacceptable, as I knew he would agree. Ayub assented and said he too felt that perhaps a waiting spell was advisable for all interested parties. He did not have any immediate motive in mind.
[Page 304]He said that his reports indicated Nehru was a very sick man and that his grip on the helm might be relaxing slightly already. He thought decline of Nehru might be quite gradual but he felt his days as head of Indian Government were numbered. He did not wish any harm to Nehru but he could not help but wonder if eventual successor government might not be more tractable and more inclined work reciprocally toward better Indo-Pak relations.
I said GOP could not be certain of a more cooperative successor government in India after withdrawal of Nehru. It was entirely possible that following government might be more difficult to deal with. I expressed hope that if Ayub had bilateral conversations in mind he would move promptly and not wait for disappearance of Nehru from scene. I expressed view that something constructive might come out of talks and even if talks failed completely at least Paks would have demonstrated willingness to talk and to search for solutions without imposition of any conditions such as 10-day time limit on preliminary talks as was stipulated last autumn. This stipulation had been misinterpreted in some quarters to Pakistan’s disadvantage.
Ayub said he was not opposed in principle to high level private talks with Indians and he would be prepared to have a private exchange with Nehru if cause of better Indo-Pak understanding might reasonably be expected to gain thereby. He did not find prospect particularly encouraging or palatable, but he was willing to make any effort which offered fair prospect of progress and he recognized that a seemingly negative position on bilateral talks while Indians maintained a seemingly positive position put Pakistan in an unfavorable light. He simply did not want to enter into an ill-prepared or premature endeavor which was foredoomed to failure, and which would have to be publicized as such, to the detriment of the objective.
I asked Ayub if he did not think any talks which might ensue should cover whole range of principal Pak-Indo problems and not be confined exclusively to Kashmir, which would have to be predominant subject.
Ayub speculated on jockeying for power in India which might be expected to follow departure of Nehru. He seemed to feel that considerable reliance could be placed on Desai to consolidate Right Wing elements and break Krishna Menon’s drive for power. He doubted if Desai could win leadership of government but felt he would play influential role. GOP was inclined to give considerable credence to reports that Nehru wanted to pave way for his daughter Indira Gandhi to succeed him at least nominally. Ayub doubted she had qualities required to assume and exercise actual powers of head of government, but she might fill a high titular position. He recognized that accession to power by Krishna Menon would be an unqualified catastrophe, and that nothing should be done which would tend to improve his prospects.
[Page 305]President was strikingly mild and relaxed on subject of supersonic planes for India. I spelled out full rationale of our concern at MIG possibility. He accepted our reasoning substantially in toto. He seemed to feel that matter would probably not come to show-down. He thought Soviet offer might prove to be to some extent a bluff, since Soviets would recognize that full acceptance MIG offer by Indians would isolate India from West and throw heavy burden of economic support and subsidization of India on Soviet Union. He said he was confident Soviets would be unwilling to pick up enormous tab for economic development to India now paid by U.S. and other Western countries. Therefore, he thought Soviet Union in show-down would probably welsh on its offer, having better use for its resources elsewhere. He also noted with interest my remark that Nehru seemed disposed to postpone indefinitely a final decision on matter. It was evident from Ayub’s moderate view of possibility that UK may feel compelled to offer few Lightning planes to India, that Sandys did excellent job when he saw Ayub last month. Although Ayub was naturally not happy at prospect, he seemed resigned to it and understood reasoning back of it. I made clear to him extent to which we had borne in mind Pakistan’s views and interests in our consideration of matter and he was grateful for this. Although he knows we are not entirely disassociated from British in this matter, he evinced no disposition to reproach us. He conjectured that Indians might be tempted to accept Soviet offer to establish an assembly plant for Soviet jet engines in India, with a view to installing the engines in British Lightning air frames.
Comment: Pakistani High Commissioner to India, Hilaly, saw President just before me and tells me that he pressed President to enter into private bilateral talks with Nehru. He feels it is all important for this to be done before Nehru’s health fails further. He says President was noncommittal and Hilaly expects to see President again in Rawalpindi before returning to Delhi. President apparently went a little farther with me than with Hilaly in indicating his willingness in principle to consider talks. However, he was quite passive in his attitude and obviously is not now inclined to take any strong initiative. My impression is that he has not thought matter through completely and has not formulated any approach to be used in talks. He is unenthusiastic or at least unconvinced as to merits of talks at this stage but recognizes that an expressed unwillingness to engage in talks is not a good stance. Therefore, we should not take any great measure of encouragement from his attitude, although it does offer a slight opening which might be enlarged by dint of some effort if we believe that our influence should now be exerted actively in favor of talks.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7-1362. Secret.↩
- Document 153.↩