153. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State0
104. I had very satisfactory 45-minute private talk with President Ayub in Karachi today. All subjects listed Department’s telegram 28071 discussed except Pakistan requests related to security guarantees, contingent planning and increased arms assistance. Ayub did not raise any of these topics.
Remainder this telegram deals with Afghan relations problem which may require immediate action. Other topics will be reported separate messages.
We reviewed present status Afghan issue. I stated my belief that Afghan position may become somewhat more flexible than heretofore. It seemed to us that there may soon be some negotiating room on both sides, and we hoped no opportunity would be lost to press for early solution. President gave me summary of Afghan portion of his recent Murree conversations with Shah of Iran. This corresponded closely with reports from our Embassy in Tehran, although as noted in Embassy’s telegram 702GOP position on Consulates less forthcoming than reported by Iranian [Page 302] Foreign Minister. Ayub said Shah urged him to allow reopening Afghan Consulates and trade agencies under close GOP police surveillance, but Ayub responded that he disliked appearance of making prisoners of Afghan representatives.
President said he was entirely willing for either Iran or US to attempt good offices and he presumed that we would concert with Iranians. He felt any third party approach to Afghans should be on a very high level and he assumed that if Iran undertook exploratory talks, Shah himself would get in touch with King.
Ayub showed in various oblique ways that he is slightly more inclined to try seriously for a settlement than he has been heretofore. I believe Shah impressed him with growing menace to entire region of increased Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, which is facilitated by Pak-Afghan rupture. Undoubtedly GOP as well as Afghanistan is feeling some cumulative pinch from cessation transit traffic and trade. Finally, Ayub seemed increasingly impressed with argument I and others have advanced that sweeping and abrupt Pak move against Consulates and trade agencies last September encouraged extreme Afghan reaction and prejudiced GOP case. I believe he now suspects that GOP handling of matter last fall may have been mistaken, notwithstanding legitimacy of GOP grievances.
When I told him that I thought some concessions might be elicited from Afghan side if Afghan face could be saved and if some reciprocal concessions could be made on GOP side, he evinced interest. He said he would be willing to consider guarded GOP exploratory conversations with Afghan representatives, but when I endeavored to probe on this he drew back, saying there was at present no place where high level Pak and Afghan representatives could get together and he felt it would be better for first move to be made through Iranians or us. He still insists he must have some sort of assurances of proper conduct of Afghan Consuls in Peshawar and Quetta and decent treatment of Pak Consuls in Afghanistan, but he granted that assurances could be private and in form that would not be demeaning to Afghans.
I outlined to him suggestion for initial attempt at agreement on partial reestablishment of Consular and trade agency facilities, coupled with a joint statement of the two governments to effect that “they have agreed to work toward early full reestablishment of Consular and trade agency offices, to function in accordance with the usually accepted tenets of international practice.” I pointed out that this formula could be construed in Pakistan as an implied assurance on part of Afghanistan Government as to the propriety of official conduct of its Consular and trade representatives and correctness of its treatment of GOP Consular offices. I did not of course go into matter of how Afghans could at same time interpret phrase as an implied admission on part of GOP that its [Page 303] abrupt closure of these offices was not in accordance with traditional international usage.
Unfortunately, President still has belief that diplomatic relations should be restored first and that lower level relations should be reestablished afterwards on a step by step basis as relations gradually improve.
I pressed on him my conviction that Afghans would feel that they could not agree to this and that effort should be for reestablishment of Consular, trade and transit relations first, or at least simultaneously with restoration diplomatic relations. While President did not commit himself on this, I believe way is open here for Shah to move discreetly into situation in preliminary way in Kabul, and would hope that Holmes could be authorized to give Shah substance of foregoing for his background use.